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“If you have understanding and heart, show only one. Both they will
damn, if both you show together.”
J.C.F. Holderlin
I. INTRODUCTION
Emancipating today’s American Indian peoples requires a
fundamental restructuring of the contemporary concept of tribal selfdetermination. Bound by their legal status as tribes, assigned to them by
Supreme Court opinions now almost 200 years old, the Indian peoples are
crippled by governing rules of law that prevent them from realizing any
meaningful measure of self-determination. By resymbolizing the Indian
peoples as “tribes,” Chief Justice John Marshall’s opinion in Johnson v.
McIntosh 1 incorporated aboriginal Indian land titles into fee simple federal
ownership, effectively subordinating the Indian peoples to paramount
federal authority. 2 Hundreds of linguistically, culturally and economically
1.
21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). Justice Reed later described
Marshall’s opinion in Johnson as rationalizing the subordinate legal status of the
Indian peoples. See Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 279–91
(1955). He candidly admitted in his opinion that America’s nineteenth century dream
of a manifest destiny would not have been realized but for the Johnson decision.
Justice Reed also bluntly acknowledged the spurious logic by which Marshall
extended preemptive federal title over a vast expanse of Indian lands in the transMississippi region that were occupied by numerous and powerful Indian peoples who
were prepared to militarily contest the United States’ claimed ownership of their lands.
Id. at 279.
2.
Professor Stephen Cornell argues that the “tribe” was created by
those European and American negotiators “who searched for and often assumed
comprehensive structures of authority or hierarchical political organization” among
the Indian peoples. STEPHEN CORNELL, THE RETURN OF THE NATIVE: AMERICAN
INDIAN POLITICAL RESURGENCE 78 (1988). Indeed, Cornell concludes that
“[c]omprehensive political organization at times was even made a prerequisite for
[federal] negotiations” with the Indian peoples. Id. at 79.
Marshall’s process of incorporating the Indian peoples and their lands within
the American domestic sphere of control was accomplished over the course of his
opinions in what is popularly called Marshall’s Indian Law Trilogy: Johnson v.
M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823) (incorporating aboriginal Indian land titles
into federal ownership); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831)
(denominating Indian peoples as “domestic, dependent nations”); Worcester v.
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distinct indigenous peoples were assimilated as tribes into the American
domestic sphere of control. Their ostensible sharing of a tribalistic
existence helped rationalize Marshall’s recharacterizing of fiercely
independent and self-sufficient Indian peoples as “domestic, dependent
nations” legally subject to paramount federal control. 3
Marshall’s Indian legal opinions repainted, in a monochrome
reddish tint, the diverse indigenous map of North America so as to project
federal sovereignty over millions of acres of Indian lands, especially in the
hotly-contested terrain west of the Mississippi River. 4 Vast areas of the

Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832) (establishing an exclusive, bilateral relationship
between the federal government and the Indian peoples).
3.
Ernest Wallace and Adamson Hoebel likewise emphasize that the
“tribe,” as a distinct legal or political entity, did not exist among the Indian peoples:
“Tribe” when applied to the Comanche is a word of sociological
but not political significance. The Comanches had a strong
consciousness of kind. A Comanche, whatever his band was a
Comanche. By dress, by speech, by thoughts and actions the
Comanches held a common bond of identity and affinity that set
them off from all other Indians—from all the rest of the world. In
this sense the tribe had meaning. The tribe consisted of a people
who had a common way of life. But that way of life did not include
political institutions or social mechanisms by which they could act
as a tribal unit.
CORNELL, supra note 2, at 75 (quoting ERNEST WALLACE & E. ADAMSON HOEBEL,
THE COMANCHES: LORDS OF THE SOUTH PLAINS 22 (1952)).
Nonetheless, no indigenous peoples of America, despite their long history as
settled, agricultural and civilized Indians, were immune from becoming “tribal” in
character and thus subject to paramount federal control. The Pueblo Indians of the
American Southwest, once judicially deemed civilized and beyond federal control,
had by the early twentieth century sunk into a “tribalistic” status that warranted federal
control of their lands and members. The Supreme Court concluded that the “people
of the pueblos, although sedentary rather than nomadic in their inclinations, and
disposed to peace and industry, are nevertheless Indians in race, customs, and
domestic government.” United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 39 (1913). Their
“tribalism” was further evidenced by their “primitive modes of life . . . influenced by
superstition and fetichism, and chiefly governed [by] . . . crude customs inherited from
their ancestors, they are a simple, uninformed and inferior people.” Id. (extending
exclusive federal control over the Pueblo peoples and their lands).
4.
Noted Indian historian Wilcomb E. Washburn asserts that Marshall
recognized that “title to the real estate of the nation,” as well as the “economic and
political demands of the millions [of non-Indians] who now populated the continent,”
hinged upon his opinion in Johnson. WILCOMB E. WASHBURN, RED MAN’S
LAND/WHITE MAN'S LAW 65–66 (2d ed. 1995).
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American West were “up for grabs,” and the Marshall Court sought to
stake the federal government’s claim to as much of that land as it could
wrest from competing European nations. Reducing the Indian peoples to
tribal status was merely one step in this unfolding process of American
Manifest Destiny. 5 But this federal process of tribalizing the Indian
peoples soon spilled over into their daily lives, locking the newly created
tribal members into a sui generis legal status as wards of the federal
government. 6
Emancipating today’s Indian peoples requires a selfdetermination strategy that will free them from the constraints of their
assigned legal status. However, a substantial federal superstructure has
grown up around this status and conspires to make its dismantlement
extremely difficult. It is composed of debilitating nineteenth-century

Equally noted Indian historian Francis Jennings explains the immense
transformation of Indian America wrought by Johnson as evidencing the “transit of
civilization.” This civilization brought with it European weeds—the ferns, thistles,
plantain, nettles, nightshade sedge—and took away for European use Indian
foodstuffs—maize, potatoes, tomatoes, chilies, and yams. FRANCIS JENNINGS, THE
FOUNDERS OF AMERICA: FROM THE EARLIEST MIGRATIONS TO THE PRESENT 25–35
(1993).
5.
Ironically, President George Washington and War Secretary Henry
Knox both emphasized respect for the Indian peoples’ aboriginal land titles and rights.
President Thomas Jefferson described the federal government’s preemptive right in
the Indian peoples’ lands:
not as amounting to any dominion or jurisdiction, or
paramountship whatever, but merely in the nature of a remainder
after the extinguishment of the present right, which gave us no
present right whatever, but of preventing other nations from taking
possession, and so defeating our expectancy; that the Indians had
the full, undivided and independent sovereignty as long as they
choose to keep it, and that this might be forever.
1 FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER: THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
AND THE AMERICAN INDIANS 59 (1984).
6.
The ambiguous legal status of individual Indians has occupied the
federal courts’ attention since the beginning of the federal-tribal relationship. Early
federal court decisions interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment’s blanket grant of
citizenship to “[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof” as excluding Indians. McKay v. Campbell, 16 F. Cas. 161, 165
(D. Or. 1871). The Supreme Court later adopted that reasoning, holding that an
individual Indian could not free himself from his tribal status by self-help through his
voluntary adoption of non-Indian ways of living. Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884)
(holding that Indians are “not subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States nor
citizens of the U.S. or the states within which they reside). Id. at 109.
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federal Indian law principles, the deep socio-economic disadvantages that
prevent tribal members from fairly participating in today’s American
society and the vested non-Indian interests which oppose any meaningful
program of tribal self-determination. It is not surprising that tribal selfdetermination, as presently conceived and implemented, has made little
contribution to the emancipation of today’s Indian peoples from those
many omnipresent economic and social ills that have made a mockery of
self-determination’s promise within Indian County. 7
My goal is to critique the contemporary doctrine of tribal selfdetermination thirty years after its inception in President Richard M.
Nixon’s famed 1970 Indian Message to Congress. 8 I focus on the three
most prominent strategies for tribal self-determination. First, I evaluate
the tribal strategy that seeks to “morph” their inherent and reserved
sovereign powers into tribal regulatory powers that are effective
throughout Indian Country. Second, I assess the tribal strategy that seeks
to develop and assert economic sovereignty over their lands, resources and
commercial relationships as a means of revitalizing Indian Country.
Third, I critique the tribal strategy that seeks to reassert traditional cultural
and religious beliefs and practices as a means to regenerate their societies
within Indian Country.
I also compare two rival perspectives on the future of tribal selfdetermination. First, I describe and evaluate what I call the standard model
of tribal self-determination within Indian Country. I conclude that this
model holds promise only for that relatively small minority of tribes who
view wealth creation as the central feature of their self-determination
effort and are willing to fundamentally reshape their traditional institutions
and beliefs to realize that goal. Second, I describe and evaluate what I call
the transcendent model of tribal self-determination within Indian Country.
I conclude that this approach to tribal self-determination may hold greater

7.
The poverty rate of the American Indians in 1980 was 40.5%, almost
six times that of the white population. A regional breakdown of the United States
shows that in those regions where the proportion of reservation Indians is the highest,
the Indian poverty rate is most severe. KLAUS FRANTZ, INDIAN RESERVATIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES: TERRITORY, SOVEREIGNTY AND SOCIOECONOMIC CHANGE 108
(1999).
8.
President Nixon’s 1970 Indian Message emphasized that the “time
has come to break decisively with the past and to create the conditions for a new era
in which the Indian future is determined by Indian acts and Indian decisions.”
Message From The President of the United States Transmitting Recommendations for
Indian Policy, H.R. Doc. No. 91-363, at 1 (1970). Nixon’s message goes on to say
“that we must make it clear that Indians can become independent of federal control
without being cut off from federal concern and support.” Id.
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promise for those tribes who value cultural renewal and social
revitalization as the central feature of their tribal self-determination effort.
Given that the tribe, that legal entity created by Marshall’s Indian
legal opinions, occupies the “design-space”—the legal, economic, and
social potentials and possibilities imagined and encountered by the Indian
peoples—of self-determination, a brief historical account of the life-cycle
of the tribe is in order.
A. The Life-Cycle of the Tribe
Understanding the historic life-cycle of the tribe—its birth, its
infancy, its adolescence, its untimely death at the hands of federal Indian
policy makers and its surprising rebirth—is essential for the successful
reconstruction of tribal self-determination.
1. Birth
Chief Justice Marshall birthed the tribe out of a primal source that
he called “the actual state of things.” 9 This pastiche of historical, cultural,
economic and geographic circumstances was orchestrated by Marshall so
as to define an exclusive, bilateral relationship between the federal
government and those indigenous peoples who were resident in America
at the time of European Discovery. 10 Once fully sovereign peoples, they
9.
Professor Rob Williams excoriates Marshall’s “actual state of things”
as a trumped-up historical explanation justifying total federal control over the Indian
peoples and their lands. Robert A. Williams, Jr., Learning Not to Live with
Eurocentric Myopia: A Reply to Professor Laurence’s Learning to Live with the
Plenary Power of Congress over the Indian Nations, 30 ARIZ. L. REV. 439, 440–42
(1988).
10.
See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). The
Worcester decision—as the leading historian of the Marshall Court, Professor G.
Edward White, points out—did not, however, alter one iota the “plight” of the
Cherokees or any of the other Eastern Indian peoples in America during the 1830s:
The Cherokees, and other Indian tribes, became in effect wards of
the federal government. The officials of that government were
acknowledged to have the power to do what Georgia had done:
place the Indians in the position of abandoning their cultural
heritage—becoming “civilized”—or being dispossessed of their
land and forced to emigrate. Being wards of the federal
government did not mean the Indians in America would have more
freedom or more respect. Their “plight,” ostensibly solved,
remained essentially the same.
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were reduced, by the operation of Marshall’s “actual state of things,” to
“domestic dependent nations.” 11 Their new status under American law,
intermediate between that of a foreign nation and that of a purely voluntary
association of individuals, Marshall denominated a “tribe.” 12
To Marshall’s credit as midwife to the tribe, he resisted the
counsel of those who said that he should abort its delivery. They argued
that it would be an illegitimate birth, born from an illicit liaison between a
suspect legal father, a dubious interpretation of a discredited sixteenthcentury European Doctrine of Discovery, and a querulous mother, the

DAVID GETCHES ET AL., FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 125 (4th ed. 1998), (citing G. EDWARD
WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815–35, at 732 (1988)).
11.
See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). The
Cherokee Nation decision, in the opinion of Professor G. Edward White, represents
the Marshall Court’s stark awareness of the precarious practical status of the Eastern
Indian peoples:
The policy of removal . . . and the dire consequences for the
[Eastern] Indian population precipitated a growing concern among
a segment of educated nineteenth-century Americans for what they
termed the “plight” of the Indians . . . caused by their inability to
acculturate. . . . Most could not adapt to white customs and
institutions: they lacked the inherent qualities of republican
yeoman. While civilizing Indians was preferable to dispossessing
them, for humanitarian and paternalistic reasons, the civilizing
process did not take in most cases. The result was a “plight”:
dependency and poverty or emigration and dispossession.
GETCHES ET AL., supra note 10, at 102–03.
12.
Marshall “contradistinguished [the Indian peoples] by a name
appropriate to themselves” and that name is “tribe.” Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.)
at 18. Stephen Cornell suggests that by “tribalizing” the Indian peoples, Marshall may
have been promoting their political maturation:
[T]ribalization could have advantages for Indians. They, too, had
political agendas; they also were in pursuit of peace, secure
borders, access to resources available only from their adversaries.
Centralized political structures, often including new leadership
positions, had advantages in dealings with European and American
governments and their representatives. As such dealings came to
play a larger role in Indian life, specialized political organization
became increasingly advantageous. It also offered opportunities to
ambitious individuals or factions seeking to expand their influence
or power.
CORNELL, supra note 2, at 79.
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oddly-crafted Indian Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution. 13 Only
a wildly mischievous child would result from this union, one who would
wreak discord within America’s tightly-knit, constitutionally-structured
nuclear family. Those legitimate members of that family—the states, the
federal government and the American people—critics warned, would
come to resent Marshall’s imposition of over 500-plus “shirt-tail”
relatives, the tribes. 14 These uncouth American relatives would likely
clamor for a place at the American family table and only disharmony
would result from forcing the states and the American people to welcome
the tribes to their table. 15
Marshall’s reasons for birthing the tribe remain cloudy and
ambiguous. Some language in his opinions arguably contemplates the
future growth and development of the tribe into a mature American

13.
There are just Indians, no tribal nations, according to Justice Johnson
in his concurring opinion in Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 25 (Johnson, J.,
concurring). These Indians, Johnson concluded, are “nothing more than wandering
hordes, held together by ties of blood and habit, and having neither laws or
government beyond what is required in a savage state.” Id. at 27. He warned the
Court that to recognize “every petty kraal of Indians, designating themselves a tribe
or nation” would do great harm to the established political fabric of the United States.
Id. at 25. The ongoing economic and political maturation of the Indian peoples and
their “advance, from the hunter state to a more fixed state of society,” would
undermine both the federal and state governments’ control of Indian lands and status.
Id. at 23.
14.
This mischief was already afoot, according to Justice Johnson, giving
the federal policy of “extend[ing] to [the Indian peoples] the means and inducement
to become agricultural and civilized.” Id. at 23. But he concluded that the ultimate
project of organizing the Indian peoples into “states” could not possibly be
accomplished without “express authority from the states.” Id. at 24.
On this point, Indian historian Francis Jennings would agree. Jennings
argues that under the social and political conditions of the nineteenth century the
“nation-state” grew by “dissolving” the Indian peoples. JENNINGS, supra note 4, at
364.
15.
Justice Baldwin agreed with Justice Johnson’s concurring opinion in
Cherokee Nation regarding the mischief that would be created by recognizing any
residual sovereignty in the Indian peoples after their incorporation into the United
States. “Within [Georgia’s] boundaries there can be no other nation, community, or
sovereign power, which this department can judicially recognize.” Cherokee Nation,
30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 47 (Baldwin, J., concurring).
Likewise, theorizing about Indian rights played little role in the thinking of
the non-Indian settler or speculator of the eastern Indian lands. Prucha remarks that
“they saw the rich lands of the Indians and they wanted them.” PRUCHA, supra note
5, at 108.
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government. 16
But realizing this possibility, given Marshall’s
characterization of the tribe as fundamentally inferior in socio-cultural
capabilities, would require the overthrow of Marshall’s famed Trilogy of
Indian law opinions. 17 His Indian law model has resulted in the birth of
500-plus, federally-recognized Indian tribes, bands and groups, who today
reside within an Indian Country that represents but a tiny fraction of their
aboriginal territorial domain. Despite the precatory language in
Marshall’s opinions, urging the American nation to assume, as guardian,
the exceptional burden of protecting and civilizing the “tribe,” history has
recorded only the hollowness and futility of his high-flown metaphors and
flowery praise of the indomitable character of Indian peoples. While the
federal government exploited Marshall’s Indian law opinions as the means
to extend American sovereignty from sea-to-sea, it did not work equally
assiduously to protect or civilize its wards, those Indian peoples who came
to be regarded as barriers to western settlement and development.18
16.

Marshall’s task in Johnson was to:

[C]onsider not only law but conscience and expediency as well.
The “natural” rights of the Indians had to be seen in terms of the
“speculative” rights of the earlier European monarchs, the
“juridical” rights of their successor American states, and the
“practical” economic and political demands of the millions who
now populated the continent.
WASHBURN, supra note 4, at 66.
17.
Noted Marshall scholar, G. Edward White, describes Marshall’s
difficulty in Johnson, and related Indian law opinions, as arising from the distinct legal
principles that he applied to define the Indian peoples’ legal status:
The Indians had been the initial possessors of the American
continent: the land and, presumably, the property rights emanating
from it were theirs . . . . The Indian tribes had been recognized from
the outset of white settlement as nations and had entered into legal
relationships, such as treaties or contracts, with whites.
Theoretically, then, Indian tribes holding land had not only rights
of sovereignty but a bundle of natural rights deserving of legal
recognition, rights related to the concepts of liberty, property, and
self-determination that occupied so exalted a position in earlynineteenth-century jurisprudence.
G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815–1835, at
704 (abr. ed. 1991).
18.
The United States’ ongoing commitment to the civilization and
protection of the Indian peoples is evident from its early proclamation in the Northwest
Ordinance of 1787: “Religion, morality, and knowledge being necessary to good
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2. Childhood
Other American leaders—such as Presidents Washington,
Jefferson and Jackson—were tasked with implementing Marshall’s
concept of the tribe in political and diplomatic terms. How should the
federal government deal with this mischievous child, the tribe? President
Washington did so by resymbolizing the tribe as the “wolf-child.” Tribal
treaty-making and Indian diplomatic relations were his means of
temporarily accommodating their putative child-like whims, caprices and
limited subsistence needs. 19 Federal military force would be used as
“predator-control” against those tribes who responded as “wolf” in raiding
or killing American settlers along the frontier.20 Washington saw the
tribes as naturally retreating west, like wolves, along with their prey—the
big game animals—who understandably fled west before the encroaching
American line of settlement. 21 Given the tribes’ rapidly declining military
powers and populations, as well as their voluntarily or federally-assisted
retreat west of the Mississippi River, Washington and other federal leaders
assumed that they would never have to set a place at the American table
for these unruly children, the tribes. 22
The tribe as perpetual “wolf-child.” No wonder why Huck Finn
and Tom Sawyer, American literature’s most famous juvenile delinquents,
openly envied the lives of the Indian peoples in the mythical Indian

government and the happiness of mankind, schools, and the means of education shall
be forever encouraged. The utmost good faith shall always be observed towards
Indians.” Northwest Ordinance of 1787, 1 Stat. 50, 52 (1789).
But consensus Indian historians agree that the federal government’s
“civilizing agenda” was never carried out with any of the Indian peoples. See Clyde
Ellis, “A Remedy for Barbarism”: Indian Schools, the Civilizing Program, and the
Kiowa-Comanche-Apache Reservation, 1871–1915, 18 AM. INDIAN CULTURE & RES.
J. 85 (1994).
19.
Washington emphasized that “policy and [economy] point very
strongly to the expediency of being upon good terms with the Indians.” Letter from
George Washington to James Duane (Sept. 7, 1783); GETCHES ET AL., supra note 10,
at 84–85.
20.
Washington’s Indian policy, which pledged to protect the Indians’
homelands while seeking to survey, sell and create non-Indian political institutions in
those very same lands, “had moved beyond contradiction, to schizophrenia,”
according to historian Elliot West. ROBERT V. HINE & JOHN MACK FARAGHER, THE
AMERICAN WEST: A NEW INTERPRETIVE HISTORY 121 (2000).
21.
Washington thought that “[s]ettlements will as certainly cause the
Savage as the Wolf to retire, both being beasts of prey tho’ they differ in shape.”
GETCHES ET AL., supra note 10, at 85.
22.
Id.
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territory. 23 They were the most fervent believers in the growing American
myth of the tribe. They—along with countless other boys throughout
Europe and America—hoped against hope that this myth would remain
forever true—that the tribe would remain spatially and spiritually far
beyond the reach and taint of American civilization. 24
Pragmatically, Marshall’s tribe served as a protean policy device,
content-empty and to be filled in by future federal governments as the
tribe’s guardian. By revisioning the tribe’s role as America’s ward, future
federal guardians could resolve any emerging contradictions or paradoxes
created by the American people’s changing attitudes towards the Indian
peoples and their need for more Indian land. This device supported the
American people’s growing conviction that the dwindling tribes should
not be entitled to assert exclusive sovereignty over vast expanses of
hunting and roaming lands that could easily accommodate thousands of
non-Indian farmers, ranchers and future industrialists. 25
3. Adolescence
Huck Finn and Tom Sawyer routinely threatened to “light out to
Indian Territory” to escape their Aunt Polly’s rigid brand of the Protestant
work ethic. 26 Many real Americans and Europeans did just that beginning
in the 1830s. Their shared motivation was to escape the dreary constraints
23.
Ironically, Mark Twain’s campaign to demolish the “Noble Savage”
stereotype created by James Fenimore Cooper and Francis Parkman is well known.
He criticized these writers as “viewing him [the Indian] through the mellow
moonshine of romance.” PHILIP S. FONER, MARK TWAIN SOCIAL CRITIC 237 (1958).
Nonetheless, he scandalized the annual dinner of the New England Society
in 1881 stating: “My first American ancestor, gentleman, was an Indian, an early
Indian. . . . Your ancestors skinned him alive, and I am an orphan.” Id.
24.
Leatherstocking, James Fenimore Cooper’s fictional backwoodsman,
speaking in 1826 already condemns the extension of American civilization in the
wilderness of Indian Country. Cooper has him decry Judge Temple’s vision of
building in the forests, “towns, manufactories, bridges, canals, mines, and all the other
resources of an old country.” HINE & FARAGHER, supra note 20, at 476.
Leatherstocking argues against civilization saying, “[T]he garden of the Lord was the
forest” and was not patterned after the “miserable fashions of our times, thereby giving
the lie to what the world calls its civilizing.” Id.
25.
John Sevier’s natural liberties philosophy served to legitimate the
aggressive attitudes of the frontiersmen. He argued that the “law of nations . . .
agree[s] that no people shall be entitled to more land that they can cultivate.” PRUCHA,
supra note 5, at 108. His frontiersman’s philosophy triumphed because the federal
government made only sporadic and feeble military efforts to regulate the non-Indian
pressure to settle Indian lands. Id. at 111–12.
26.
See generally FONER, supra note 23, at 236–38.
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of the school-house, work-house, jailhouse and business firm. This led
countless European and American artists, writers, mountain men and
criminals to flee to Indian Country. 27 Add to that influx those many
escaped African-American slaves who found a different type of
emancipation among the tribes, and you will see why so many non-Indians
had a stake in maintaining Marshall’s myth of the tribe. 28
What did all these non-Indian escapees to Indian Country have in
common? They sought to restore a palpable freedom, drama and challenge
to lives that had grown cold and predictable under civilization’s weight. 29
But it was the brief flowering, during the short-lived adolescence of the
tribe, of the “horse and gun” Great Plains Indian culture that truly
27.
The American frontier had spawned a subculture of a breed of
lawless, sometimes depraved, men who lived off clandestine trade with the Indians.
The Indian fur trade literally created these men who went off with their packs for
months on end into the wilderness. Paul Prucha emphasizes that though they often
took Indian wives, they nonetheless “mercilessly exploited the Indians, debauched
them with whiskey, and robbed them of their furs.” PRUCHA, supra note 5, at 95.
By contrast, the authentic portrayal of the vanishing Indian way of life on
the Great Plains is what motivated painters such as Samuel Seymour, George Catlin
and Karl Bodmer to make the dangerous trek into Indian Country. Seymour’s goal
was to paint portraits of Indians and reproduce landscapes noted for their “beauty and
grandeur.” Catlin avowed that “nothing short of the loss of my life shall prevent me
from . . . becoming [the Indians’] historian.” HINE & FARAGHER, supra note 20, at
481. He had “flown to their rescue—not of their lives or of their race (for they are
‘doomed’ and must perish), but to the rescue of their looks and their modes.” Id. at
482. Bodmer, who accompanied Prince Maxmillian on his visits to the Mandan
villages of the Upper Missouri River, used his painting skills to provide an artistic
accompaniment to his patron’s ethnographic writings. His paintings are used today in
reconstructing the traditional clothing, rituals and life-ways of his Indian subjects. Id.
at 482–83.
28.
“[Slaves who lived near] the Indian nations . . . frequently tempted
fate by striking out for freedom.” JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN & LOREN SCHWENINGER,
RUNAWAY SLAVES: REBELS ON THE PLANTATION 25 (1999). Professor Franklin asserts
that these runaway slaves were “more likely to head for the [Indian nations than] the
[ostensibly free area of] Ohio.” Id. at 121.
He also quotes a federal military officer stationed in south Georgia in the
early nineteenth century who asserts that he “[has] ascertained beyond any doubt [that]
a connection exists between a portion of the slave population and the Seminoles” so
as to facilitate Indian raids on the plantations. Id. at 87.
29.
Teddy Roosevelt, after the death of his wife in childbirth, left his baby
daughter in the care of family members and headed to the Dakotas to live for three
years on a cattle ranch. His motive was to feel the “beat of hearty life in our being . .
. the glory of work and the joy of living.” HINE & FARAGHER, supra note 20, at 496.
Likewise Owen Wister, the famous writer, went west to regain his health and
to “[free] himself from what to him was a deadly life” as a Boston businessman. Id.
at 497.
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cemented the American myth of the tribe. 30 The Cree and Ojibway had
received the horse and the gun from French fur traders in the early 1800s.
This newly available technology spread rapidly to the tribes of the Great
Plains, the horse giving them mobility and the gun giving them firepower.
These two technologies combined to create a tribal “high-culture” period
during which the Great Plains Indian peoples lived lives organized around
raiding, inter-tribal warfare and buffalo hunting. 31 With the horse and the
gun they were also able to seriously impede, if not completely stem, the
illegal incursion by thousands of non-Indians who crossed the Great Plains
en route to Oregon and California, killing the buffalo and other big game
as they went. 32
The cycle of Indian treaties negotiated by President Johnson’s
Indian “Peace Commission” between 1867 and 1868 guaranteed many of
the Great Plains tribes the “exclusive use and occupancy” of their vast
hunting and roaming areas. 33 But as a practical matter, the federal
government proved both unable and unwilling to protect tribal lands from
non-Indian intrusion.
The federal government sought instead in the 1870s to renegotiate
these treaties so as to require the tribes to give up their nomadic way of
life in favor of farming and ranching. But this suggestion was particularly
objectionable to those tribes who saw farming as suitable employment
only for women or the disabled. Other tribes saw farming as sacrilege and
disrespectful of the earth itself. Not surprisingly, few tribes agreed to
voluntarily settle down and forego hunting, raiding and roaming in their

30.
Horses, either stolen by Indians from the Spaniards or redomesticated by them from the wild, appealed strongly to the Plains Indians. So
strongly, in fact, that Professor Francis Jennings concludes that the horse “stimulate[d]
revolutionary cultural change from sedentary horticulture to the mobility of hunters
and raiders of ‘horse Indian’ fame.” JENNINGS, supra note 4, at 166.
31.
Professor Hine argues that the horse allowed the “Indian peoples to
reclaim the . . . American heartland” and become the “first settlers of the Great Plains.”
HINE & FARAGHER, supra note 20, at 138.
Thus, the “mounted warrior of the plains—the ubiquitous and romantic
symbol of native America—was in fact not an aboriginal character at all but one born
from the colonial collision of cultures.” Id.
32.
Killing the bison, Professor Jennings concluded, was seen by the nonIndians as a “quick way of getting rid of the Indians who were also conceived of as
vermin.” JENNINGS, supra note 4, at 372.
33.
Marshall’s Indian law decisions and later federal Indian treaties
confirmed the Indian people’s exclusive use and occupancy rights in vast hunting and
roaming reserves in the American West. CORNELL, supra note 2, at 45–50.
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traditional areas and during their traditional seasons. 34 This blatant tribal
resistance to “growing up” justified, according to federal policy makers,
the use of military force to settle the recalcitrant tribes on newlyestablished Indian reservations. 35
Forcing the resistant Great Plains tribes onto reservations proved
to be easier said than done. They rarely had much trouble escaping the
army columns sent to round them up. 36 Entire camps, including women,
children and the elderly, proved elusive targets in terrain where an
unobserved approach by an army column was extremely difficult. If the
troops pressed too closely, the Indians would disperse, forcing the army
commander to either give up pursuit or persist against a steadily
diminishing target. 37
But, despite the tribes’ successful guerrilla tactics, the tide slowly
turned against their continued resistance. Federal soldiers would routinely
destroy the camp equipment and household materials of those Indians who
fled to escape reservation life. They would likewise seize or destroy the
Indian pony herds they captured. 38 Combined with the ongoing, nonIndian slaughter of the buffalo for their hides in the 1870s, there was little
hope that the Great Plains tribes could long maintain their war of resistance
against the federal government. 39
By recharacterizing those tribes who resisted reservation
settlement as savages and malcontents, the federal government sought to
mobilize American public sentiment in favor of its ruthless “search and
destroy” military missions. Ironically, it was just one such mission that
resulted in the tribes’ greatest military triumph over federal army troopers.
On June 25, 1876, at the Battle of the Little Bighorn, the combined Indian
forces of Sioux and Cheyenne warriors killed over half of the army
troopers in the Seventh Cavalry Regiment. 40 This Indian victory spawned

34.
Few Indian peoples tried to adopt agriculture because, among other
reasons, they had been “pushed into places where soil was poor and water was scarce.”
JENNINGS, supra note 4, at 372.
35.
That the Indians who wiped out Custer’s troops did so in defense of
their families is crystal clear to Professor Francis Jennings. “[B]ullheadedly
disregarding warnings and defying orders,” Custer was “on the way to perpetrate
another in a series of his own [Indian] massacres.” Id. at 377.
36.
WILLIAM T. HAGAN, HOW THE WEST WAS LOST, INDIANS IN
AMERICAN HISTORY 182 (Frederick E. Hoxie ed., 1988).
37.
Id.
38.
Id. at 183.
39.
Id. at 184.
40.
JENNINGS, supra note 4, at 377.
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a wave of American vengeance against any tribe that resisted settlement
on a reservation under the watchful eye of federal troops. 41
Resymbolized as unfeeling, bloodthirsty savages who understood
and respected only greater cruelty than they could inflict, the Indian
peoples were successfully recharacterized by the federal government in a
new light. 42 No longer the impulsive, willful child who had to be placated
with flowery promises and cheap trinkets, the Indian had been recast as
the malevolent “other.” It was he—the treacherous, unscrupulous reddevil who raped white women for pleasure and burned wagon trains for
entertainment—who merited extermination if he refused to settle on the
reservation. It was he who would be forever engraved on the American
consciousness as symbolizing the uncontrollable, and therefore dangerous,
aspects of an uncivilized human nature. It was he who would be endlessly
shot, stabbed, hung, starved, dismembered, buried or burned alive, without
a tear shed, in those countless popular western melodramas passed off as
the “dime novel” American epic of the Winning of the West. 43
41.
The military subjugation of the Apaches, Sioux and Nez Perce by the
federal cavalry in the 1870s marked the effective end of armed Indian resistance on
the Great Plains and in the Far West. The collapse of Indian military might left the
Indian peoples vulnerable to retributive congressional action and the pressures of
treaty negotiators. Cornell cites the words of Shoshone Chief Washakie in 1878 as
the closing eulogy of this era: “Our fathers were steadily driven out, or killed, and we,
their sons, but sorry remnants of tribes once mighty, are cornered in little spots of the
earth all ours by right—cornered like guilty prisoners and watched by men with guns.”
CORNELL, supra note 2, at 50.
42.
The reportrayal of the Indian as killer was abetted by the writers of
the dime novels who produced an “objectified mass dream” that mapped the fixations
of their readership on “savage redskins, vicious greasers and heathen Chinese” who
were routinely “laid low” by conventional white heroes. HINE & FARAGHER, supra
note 20, at 478.
But it was Teddy Roosevelt in his multi-volume work, Winning of the West,
who officially legitimated this view of the Indian as unredeemably cruel and
treacherous:
Not only were they very terrible in battle, but they were cruel
beyond all belief in victory . . . . The hideous, unnameable,
unthinkable tortures practiced by the red men on their captured
foes, and on their foes’ tender women and helpless children, were
such as we read of in no other struggle, hardly even the revolting
pages that tell the deeds of the Holy Inquisition.
Nathan Glazer, American Epic: Then and Now, PUB. INTEREST, Winter 1998, at 12.
43.
By the 1880s the bloodthirsty Indian warrior had become a mere
stage prop for furnishing the American stage set of the “winning of the west.” It was
Buffalo Bill Cody’s “Wild West Shows” of that era that embodied these “dime novel
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4. Death
Mid-nineteenth century federal Indian policy, embodied in a
principle of “measured tribal separatism,” assumed the Great Plains
tribes—influenced by treaty annuities, education and non-Indian
missionaries—would voluntarily adapt to a non-Indian way of life. 44 But
soon after the end of the Indian wars in the 1870s and the settlement of
those tribes onto reservations, western congressmen and the BIA
condemned the separatism policy as being too soft on tribalism. It had
only served to encourage the false hope among the tribes that they could
somehow continue their hunting and roaming way of life. 45
What the tribes required, these reformers argued, was the stern
hand of a federal guardian who treated them, not as semi-sovereign
peoples capable of treaty making, but as what they had become—
dependent governmental wards. The tribe was viewed by these reformers
as the major impediment to quickly converting tribal members into
farmers, ranchers and wage-laborers.
They consciously underemphasized the side benefit of their proposed Indian allotment program—
the release of millions of acres of tribal trust lands to non-Indian
settlement. 46
illusions in flesh and blood.” HINE & FARAGHER, supra note 20, at 501. Cody shot,
killed and scalped a Cheyenne warrior and added the Indian’s scalp to his show for
his audience to feel and touch, thus converting melodrama into the flesh of reality. Id.
44.
By statute in 1834 Indian Country was defined as:
[A]ll that part of the United States west of the Mississippi, and not
within the states of Missouri or Louisiana, or the territory of
Arkansas, and, also, that part of the United States east of the
Mississippi river, and not within any state to which Indian title has
not been extinguished, for the purpose of this act, [shall be] deemed
to be Indian Country.
Regulation of Trade and Intercourse with the Indian Tribes Act, 4 Stat. 729 (1834).
Later, many Great Plains Indian peoples, in exchange for giving up
expansive claims to their aboriginal territories, reserved, by treaty, vast hunting and
roaming areas for their exclusive use and occupancy. They were assured by the federal
government that “as long as [the] rivers run” those lands would be theirs. GETCHES
ET AL., supra note 10, 140–41.
45.
Bishop Whipple, among other influential friends of the Indian,
wanted President Lincoln to treat the Indian peoples as governmental wards, not as
members of quasi-sovereign political entities. PRUCHA, supra note 5, at 470.
46.
The reform-minded Board of Indian Commissioners had come to
support the principle of Indian allotment as a means of assimilating and civilizing the
Indian peoples. At the famous Lake Mohonk Conference in 1884, the Board endorsed
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But many treaties with the Great Plains tribes had guaranteed the
territorial integrity of the tribes’ reserved lands. 47 Modification of those
territorial boundaries required a favorable vote by at least a majority of the
adult male members of those tribes. 48 To accomplish their goals, these
Indian reformers would have to breach these Indian treaties long deemed
to be part of the controlling law of the land under the Supremacy Clause
of the United States Constitution. Their attack focused on what they called
“the evils of tribalism”: communal Indian land tenure; extravagant giveaways by wealthy tribal members to their less fortunate tribesmen; weeklong inter-tribal festivals and pow-wows and traditional celebrations of
heathen religious practices such as the Sun Dance ceremony. Branding
tribalism as anti-American, as well as heathen in nature, they recruited a
wide array of supporters to their anti-tribalism crusade: mainstream
religious organizations who sought to evangelize the Indians; non-Indian
ranchers and farmers who coveted the Indians’ prairie and arable land
base; land-starved emigrants from Scandinavia and elsewhere who arrived
too late to obtain homesteads under the 1862 Homestead Act; and those
liberal friends of the Indian who wanted to salvage those Indian people
who could successfully adapt to a non-Indian way of life. 49
The federal government’s resulting war on tribalism from the
1880s to the 1930s resymbolized the complex, life-affirming, cultural and
social practices of diverse Indian peoples as the major road block to their
assimilation into American society. 50 But freeing up Indian lands for non“heartily” the allotment concept. Non-Indian settlers supported allotment because it
would eventually release millions of acres of Indian lands as “surplus lands” for nonIndian entry and settlement. PRUCHA, supra note 5, at 659–71.
47.
Marshall’s Indian law decisions and related federal treaties confirmed
the Indian peoples’ exclusive use and occupancy rights in vast hunting and roaming
reserves in the American West. CORNELL, supra note 2, at 45–50.
48.
Article 12 of the 1867 treaty with the Kiowa and Comanche Tribes
of Indians provided that:
No treaty for the cession of any portion or part of the reservation
herein described, which may be held in common, shall be of any
validity or force against the said Indians, unless executed and
signed by at least three-fourths of all the adult male Indians
occupying the same, and no cession by the tribe shall be understood
or construed in such manner as to deprive, without his consent, any
individual member of the tribe of his rights to any tract of land
selected by him as provided by Article III (VI) of this treaty.
Treaty of Medicine Lodge Creek, Oct. 21, 1867, art. 12, 15 Stat. 581, 585.
49.
PRUCHA, supra note 5, at 659–71.
50.
Id.
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Indian use, rather than emancipating individual tribal members from the
clutches of superstition and communal land holding, was the real goal of
the 1880s Indian reform movement. 51
This goal was to be achieved via the General Indian Allotment Act
of 1887. 52 Its provisions envisioned the federal assignment of homesteadsized parcels of agricultural land to each eligible tribal member on
reservations throughout Indian Country. Those Indian lands that were
deemed surplus to the allotment needs of a particular reservation would be
“opened” for settlement and sold to non-Indian homesteaders for about a
$1.25 an acre. The funds obtained from the sale of surplus Indian lands
would be deposited to the affected tribe’s United States Treasury Account.
Those funds could be expended, in the federal government’s discretion,
for the civilizing and subsistence needs of the affected Indians. 53
The avowed goal of Indian allotment was the destruction of both
tribes and tribalism. 54 The federal government could assert direct control
over its newly-created class of Indian allottees only if tribes were
effectively removed as governing institutions. However, the Great Plains
tribes, like the Kiowa and Comanche, fiercely resisted allotment. Led by
Chief Lone Wolf of the Kiowa and Comanche Indians, they challenged in
the United States Supreme Court the federal government’s power to
breach its sovereign agreements guaranteeing the territorial integrity of
reserved Indian lands. 55 The Supreme Court rejected Lone Wolf’s
challenge to Indian allotment and modified federal Indian law so as to
accommodate the changed status of the tribes as governmental wards.56 In
its 1903 decision in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 57 the Court completed its
subordination of the tribe to federal plenary power. 58
51.
Id.
52.
General Allotment Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331–358, 381 (1994).
53.
GETCHES ET AL., supra note 10, at 165–75.
54.
Id. at 166–67.
55.
Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
56.
From Justice White’s viewpoint, the Indian peoples’ right of
occupancy was not equivalent to ownership of their lands. The federal government
was owner of those lands and could effect a change in the Indians’ use of those lands
if it was necessary for the Indians’ benefit. Id.
57.
187 U.S. 553 (1903). Professor David Getches places Lone Wolf’s
struggle against forced allotment of the Kiowa-Comanche reservation within the
Indian pantheon of resistance actions that resisted the placement of their peoples on
“the white man’s road.” GETCHES ET AL., supra note 10, at 190.
58.
Professor Blue Clark places the Lone Wolf decision in the larger,
international law context when he analyzes Henry Cabot Lodge’s reliance upon that
decision, among other Indian law decisions, as the basis for the United States’
assumption of guardianship over “domestic, dependent nations” during Senate debates
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The disastrous empirical consequences of allotment for the Indian
peoples are well-known. About 90 to 100 million acres of Indian lands
were lost to tribal ownership, leaving a tribal trust land base of only some
40 million acres to support the surviving Indian peoples. 59 Much of this
lost tribal acreage fell into non-Indian ranchers’ and farmers’ hands or
reverted to the states for non-payment, by those “competent” Indian
allottees, of local property taxes. 60
Few commentators have addressed the qualitative effects of
allotment on the Indian peoples. I will briefly comment on these issues.
First, allotment displaced traditional tribal land uses in favor of intensive,
land-degrading ranching and dry-land farming practices by non-Indian
settlers and Indian allottees. The health of the remaining Indian range and
agricultural land-base quickly deteriorated due to these altered land use
patterns. 61 For example, prior to allotment on the Fort Berthold Indian
Reservation in North Dakota, tribal families subsisted largely on produce
from their communally-farmed gardens. This gardening represented
primarily the labor of tribal women, but some men did assist them. 62
Along with hunting and berry-gathering, this community gardening
sustained generations of Indian people on Fort Berthold, as well as on
over the federal government’s assumption of guardianship over the “dark-skinned”
peoples of the Philippines. BLUE CLARK, LONE WOLF V. HITCHCOCK: TREATY RIGHTS
AND INDIAN LAW AT THE END OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 102–03 (1994).
59.
GETCHES ET AL., supra note 10, at 165–71.
60.
John Collier, Commissioner of Indian Affairs during the 1930s and
early 1940s, testified before the Senate Indian Affairs Committee in 1934 regarding
the adverse effects of allotment on Indian land use and ownership and said:
Through the allotment system, more than 80 percent of the land
value belonging to the Indians in 1887 has been taken away from
them; more than 85 percent of the land value of all allotted Indians
has been taken away. And the allotment system, working through
the partitionment or sale of the land of deceased allottees,
mathematically insures and practically requires that the remaining
Indian allotted land shall pass to the whites. The allotment act
contemplates total landlessness for the Indians of the third
generation of each allotted tribe.
GETCHES ET AL., supra note 10, at 172.
61.
Commissioner Collier testified before the Senate Indian Affairs
Committee in 1934 that allotment “precluded the integrated use of the land by [Indian]
individuals or families, even at the start.” Id. at 171.
62.
Professor Virginia Peters stresses that “[b]efore the Europeans
arrived the village tribes had engaged in a centuries-old pattern of intertribal barter,
using corn, raised by the women, as their medium of exchange.” VIRGINIA B. PETERS,
WOMEN OF THE EARTH LODGES: TRIBAL LIFE ON THE PLAINS 143–57 (1995).

SOVEREIGN BARGAINS PROOF (Do Not Delete)

2017

9/9/2017 12:05 PM

TRIBES AS RICH NATIONS

137

other reservations. Allotment rendered that continued agricultural use
impracticable on those reservations. The boosters of allotment predicted
that it would stimulate the rise of a hardy, self-reliant, yeoman class of
Indian farmers and ranchers. The reality was that Indian allotments on
virtually all of the allotted Indian reservations fell into disuse and decay. 63
Second, allotment encouraged tribal members to shed their tribal
identities in favor of American citizenship. 64 By voluntarily accepting an
allotment and by successfully completing their transition into successful
farmers or ranchers, tribal members could earn American citizenship. 65
By this means the federal government sought to undermine the
significance of tribal affiliation. However, few Indians valued American
citizenship enough to sacrifice their tribal identities in an effort to become
successful Indian ranchers and farmers. 66 Those relatively few Indian

63.
Id.
64.
Historian Fergus M. Bordewich speaks to federal ceremonies held on
various Great Plains reservations in the 1880s designed to impress upon would-be
Indian allottees the importance of federal citizenship:
An outdoor ceremony was staged at Timber Lake to impress the
allottees with the importance of citizenship.
They stood
resplendent in the feathers and fringed buckskin of a bygone age,
facing Major James McLaughlin, a shrewd and hard man who was
known to all Sioux as the Indian agent who had ordered the arrest
of Sitting Bull in 1890. Ramrod-stiff, cigar in hand, McLaughlin
watched as each Indian solemnly stepped from a tepee and shot an
arrow to signify that he was leaving behind his Indian way of life.
Moving forward, he then placed his hand on a plow to demonstrate
that he had chosen to live the farming life of a white man. He was
next handed a purse to remind him to save what he earned. Finally,
holding the American flag, the Indian repeated these words:
“Forasmuch as the President has said that I am worthy to be a
citizen of the United States, I now promise this flag that I will give
my hands, my head, and my heart to the doing of all that will make
me a true American citizen.”
It was the culminating,
transformative moment of which Dawes had dreamed.
FERGUS M. BORDEWICH, KILLING THE WHITE MAN’S INDIAN: REINVENTING NATIVE
AMERICANS AT THE END OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 122–23 (1996).
65.
Id.
66.
Historian Bordewich concludes that the allotment process intended
to “transform Indians into yeoman farmers” but instead “sapped the vitality of
traditional tribal government, and terminated the possibility that Indian societies might
be able to evolve at their own pace according to their own standards.” Id. at 124.
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allottees who did assimilate to a non-Indian way of life were deemed by
their tribesmen to be “white Indians.” 67
Third, allotment encouraged Indian parents to send their children
to the newly-created federal Indian boarding schools.68 An American-type
education was deemed to be the most reliable means for assimilating
Indian children into a non-Indian society. 69 It was the archetypal means
for disabusing those children of their inherited tribal superstitions and
beliefs, and it was also the means of separating those children from their
parents, clan-uncles and clan-aunts who remained behind in the Indian
camps. 70
Fourth, allotment fundamentally resymbolized the Indian peoples’
relationship to their lands as well as to their fellow tribesmen. 71 By
67.
“Blood fusion” between tribal Indians and non-Indians was a process
that allotment accelerated as a means of assimilating the Indian people into American
society. Id. at 328–29.
68.
Indian education in off-reservation, federally-run, boarding schools
was the brain-child in 1879 of Captain Richard Henry Pratt. He considered Indian
reservation life as a morally repugnant form of segregation, but nonetheless advocated
the physical separation of Indian children from their parents and families so as to
promote their assimilation in a non-Indian way of life. He argued that the Indian is
“born a blank,” and with neither “ideas of civilization nor savagery.” Id. at 282.
69.
Id.
70.
Id.
71.
The Mandan and Arikara women’s historic relationship to the land
represented an interlacing of sexual, social and economic statuses within their village
life along the Missouri River. Professor Virginia Peters powerfully depicts this
complicated relationship by writing:
Many young men and a few of the old helped pick the ears of ripe
corn as they had during the green corn harvest. For this the women
paid them by building fires near their piles of corn on which they
placed kettles containing corn and meat. The men and girls were
all painted and dressed in their best clothes. The prettiest girls
always had the largest group of young men around their piles of
corn. As the husking proceeded, any unripe ears were [placed]
aside to become the property of the male helpers. They either ate
them or fed them to their ponies; the women did not want them
because they would rot and spoil the ripe corn if placed in caches.
Although there was much rejoicing and jollity at harvest time, there
was a serious undertone. The village women felt a sacred duty to
be sure that every ear of corn was gathered and used for some
purpose. A missionary told Wilson that an Arikara woman whom
she knew dropped every seed with a kind of prayer. The Arikara
legend of the “Forgotten Ear” emphasizes the women’s love for
their gardens and the food they produce. One day an Arikara
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insisting that the Indian must repudiate his tribal identity as the means of
entering American society, allotment demonstrated the federal
government’s deep fear and mistrust of tribalism. As a practical matter,
the only goal that allotment achieved was that it transferred millions of
acres of Indian lands to non-Indians. Colorado’s Senator Henry Teller was
the lone voice protesting the Indian allotment bill in the Senate, and he
predicted that allotment would impoverish the Indian both economically
and spiritually. All contemporary commentators agree that allotment did
realize that goal. 72
By creating a deep psychological divide between the Indian
peoples and their lands, it created new, antagonistic classes of Indians.
Class membership was defined by possession of greater and lesser degrees
of tribal blood. Members of these classes allegedly responded differently
to the economic and social incentives offered by the allotment program.
A new class of Indian cultural brokers arose; Indian men and women who
could interpret the allotment directives of the newly empowered BIA to
the “blanket Indians”—usually those greater than half-blood tribal
members who resisted allotment in particular and civilization in general. 73
woman thought she heard a child begging not to be left behind
when she started to leave her field. She searched through her whole
garden until at last she finally found one small ear of corn which
she had overlooked. As soon as she gathered in the corn, the crying
stopped.
PETERS, supra note 62, at 119–20.
72.
GETCHES ET AL., supra note 10, at 171–73.
73.
A brief case study of how allotment created and sustained class
divisions among the Indian peoples on the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation, North
Dakota, from the late 1880s to the 1990s is provided by Professor Castle McLaughlin.
See Castle McLaughlin, Nation, Tribe, and Class: The Dynamics of Agrarian
Transformation on the Fort Berthold Reservation, 22 AMER. INDIAN CULTURE & RES.
J. 101 (1998).
He describes a relational model that was “generated over time by the
‘structured context’ of the [Fort Berthold] reservation[’s] political economy and in
response to the situated positions and social identities of others.” Id. at 105.
McLaughlin emphasizes that Indian allotment on Fort Berthold and other
Great Plains Indian reservations had as its goal the “dissolution of tribal organization
and the assimilation of Indian individuals . . . [via] the adoption of practices and values
associated with a capitalist democracy, such as the nuclear family organization,
Christianity, the ‘Protestant ethic,’ and utilitarianism.” Id. at 106.
He describes the application of the allotment process on Fort Berthold:
As on other reservations, agrarian enterprises—first farming, then
livestock production—were used as a vehicle for promoting
individual “civilization” at Fort Berthold. Cattle were first
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Allotment also resulted in a deeply disaffected class of Indian men
and women. They bought into its personal emancipatory promise that, by
obtaining an American-style education, they could bridge the great social
distance between their discarded tribal identities and assume a new life as
an esteemed American professional such as a lawyer, educator, doctor, or
political leader. Many of these individuals became the objects of derision,
laughed at openly by Indian and non-Indian alike for their pretentious
airs. 74
distributed as part of a federal payment following an 1886
agreement (ratified in 1891) by which the Fort Berthold people
relinquished 228,168 acres of their 1,193,788-acre reservation and
agreed to the allotment of the remaining 965,620 acres. Between
that year and 1902, the U.S. government spent $140,000 of tribal
funds on livestock, and the number of Indian-owned cattle rose
from 400 to 7,000 head. Prior to a 1910 land cession, the sale of
beef to the government and to markets such as Chicago accounted
for nearly half of the total income on the reservation. While
“unearned income” from land sales and leases became the most
significant income source after 1910, during the following decade
the value of crops raised ($367,549) and the livestock sold
($419,984) at Fort Berthold far surpassed income from (primarily
per diem) wage labor ($144,951).
Id. at 107.
74.
Allotment and related federal financial-assistance programs directed
to foster Indian ranching enterprises on the Fort Berthold Reservation have resulted in
class-based conflict between the Indian landowning community and the ranching
community. Here is how McLaughlin describes this conflict in the 1980s and 1990s
on Fort Berthold:
Class consciousness has developed from both opposing material
interests and contrasting ideological and moral frameworks that
guide interaction between people and the natural world.
Landowners have been led to assign commodity values to their
lands and have constructed their identity in part from their inability
to control and realize “fair returns” for its use; they have developed
a keen sense of their position within the local political economy.
Unequal relations of exchange, not production per se, have
engendered the construction of these class identities. Ranchers are
viewed as having repudiated the signs and practice of reciprocity,
which both functions as a material “safety net” and serves as
metaphor for the commensal social order: “Half of us are starving,
but they’d die before they’d give us a beef.” Age, gender (most
[Indian] landowners are tribal elders, and today many are women),
internally perceived racial differences (many ranchers are of mixed
heritage), and commitment to traditional values are all drawn on
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By exacerbating political and social tensions within reservation
population segments—particularly the animosities between the full-blood
and half-blood factions—allotment sought to explode tribalism from
within. Traditionalists, those Indians who opposed the BIA and its
civilizing programs, were said to represent the full-blood reservation
political contingent. They were at odds with the modernists, those Indians
who sought to shape the BIA’s civilizing programs to their benefit, who
were said to represent the half-blood reservation political contingent.
Allotment sought to explode tribalism from the inside by mapping
new economic and social incentives onto intra-tribal relations. It
encouraged those more astute, better educated Indians to assert their
individual interests at the expense of their less well-endowed tribesmen.
It sought to recruit the newly created allottees as agents of social change
who would transform tribalism from within. 75

for the discursive construction of materially reproduced
differences. One young landowner characterized conflict between
ranchers, landowners and the tribe as “spiritual warfare” and
forecast, “Eventually, the tribe will end up buying all the land, and
then Uncle Sam will come and collect.”
Id. at 124.
75.
McLaughlin graphically describes the rise of a new “ranching class,”
born of allotment and related federal policies, on the Fort Berthold Reservation:
[T]he government “patronage system” rewarded this incipient
private sector through the provision of unsecured reimbursable
loans and by utilizing proceeds from tribal land sales for the
establishment of demonstration farms and for the purchase of highgrade livestock. Such practices were frequently protested by older
traditional leaders, who regarded such use of tribal funds as
inequitable and whose formal influence and ability to redistribute
goods were undermined by the emergent agrarian entrepreneurs.
Initially, ranchers organized economic labor and galvanized
support within indigenous social institutions such as kinship
groups, using their skills and relative wealth to become prominent
leaders. Under pressure to assimilate and increasingly invested in
market exchange, by the 1920s and 1930s agrarian entrepreneurs
had begun to disengage partially from such social and moral
networks and associated responsibilities. As the child of a
successful Fort Berthold rancher recalled, “My father wasn’t much
of a ‘pow-wower’; he regarded dances and give-aways as a waste
of time and money.”
Id. at 107–08.
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It also introduced exotic agents of social change into tribalism. It
encouraged non-Indian farmers and ranchers to undermine traditional
tribal land uses by seizing the opportunity to lease Indian lands from the
BIA at cut-rate prices. By inter-marrying with tribal women and
cooperating with the BIA in managing fractious tribal members, these nonIndians became the most conservative force in opposing future efforts at
tribal self-determination. 76 Allotment also created a new class of landless
Indians by later allowing disabled or incompetent tribal members to sell
or lease their allotments to non-Indians so as to realize a subsistence
income. 77 The 1906 Burke Act enlarged this landless Indian class by
issuing so-called “forced fee patents” to those Indians who were deemed
by a federal commission competent to manage their own affairs.78
Ironically, it was the better-educated, half-blood or less tribal members
who received these forced fee patents from the federal competency
commissions. Once freed of trust status, those lands became taxable and
most of those lands were lost to Indian ownership for failure to pay county
or state property taxes. 79
Despite the federal government’s formal repudiation of Indian
allotment in 1934, the damage had already been done. 80 Allotment, along
with other introduced federal laws designed to disrupt tribalism in the late
nineteenth-century such as the Indian Major Crimes Act of 1886, 81 was
intended to resymbolize a new Indian ideal: the white man’s Indian. 82

76.
Id.
77.
Some of the successful Indian ranchers on Fort Berthold exploited
the Burke Act to avoid BIA regulation of their grazing practices according to
McLaughlin. They converted their trust-patent lands to fee-patent status and led the
agency superintendent to charge that at least forty “of the more intelligent and thrifty
Indians” were avoiding the reservation-wide cattle round-ups and working their stock
without agency supervision. Id. at 108.
78.
Congress established so-called “competency commissions” to assess
whether one-half blood or less Indian allottees were sufficiently assimilated to be
required to accept a “forced fee-patent.” See 25 U.S.C. § 349 (2001). Thousands of
such patents were issued to Indians, and many lost their allotted lands for non-payment
of county or state property taxes. GETCHES ET AL., supra note 10, at 174.
79.
Id.
80.
Section one of the Indian Reorganization Act states: “No land of any
Indian reservation . . . shall be allotted in severalty to any Indian.” 25 U.S.C. § 461
(2001).
81.
23 Stat. 385 (1885).
82.
Army Captain Richard Henry Pratt, a key architect of federal Indian
education in the 1880s, advocated the “killing of the Indian, so as to save the man
inside.” DAVID H. DEJONG, PROMISES OF THE PAST: A HISTORY OF INDIAN EDUCATION
IN THE UNITED STATES 116 (1993).
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Thus, the very idea of “Indianness” became a contested meaning that
embodied the legal and administrative needs of the federal government,
rather than the cultural survival requirements of the Indian peoples.83 By
seeking to take jurisdiction not only over the Indians’ lands but over their
personal conduct as well, the federal government sought to end tribalism
forever. But allotment did not succeed in destroying tribalism. It merely
shifted the focus of the contest from the external world to the internal lifeworlds of the Indian peoples. In that forum, any federal policy will always
be doomed to defeat. 84
5. Rebirth
Killing the tribe proved difficult, despite the federal government’s
best efforts. The Indian peoples themselves survived the Indian allotment
era that stretched from the 1880s to the 1920s. Public revulsion against
the allotment era’s results spurred federal studies such as the 1928
Merriam Report that found that the Indian peoples were, by far, the most
isolated and impoverished American minority. 85 But the rebirth of the
tribe is associated with one man: Indian Commissioner John C. Collier. 86
Reviving tribalism was to be achieved through the implementation within

Mr. Thomas Morgan, Indian Commissioner from 1889 to 1893, was also
convinced that compulsory federal schooling would “turn the American Indian into
the Indian American.” Clyde Ellis, ‘A Remedy for Barbarism’: Indian Schools, The
Civilizing Program and the Kiowa-Comanche-Apache Reservation, 1871-1915, 18
AMER. INDIAN CULTURE & RES. J. 85 (1994).
83.
Democracy was defined as a “caste system” organized by European
conceptions of race in late nineteenth-century America. Those Americans with
virtually any degree of African or Asian ancestry were defined by local law as
“colored” and subjected to various legal disabilities due to their status. Not
surprisingly, the federal government likewise began to “grade” Indian peoples
according to their degree of Indian blood. JENNINGS, supra note 4, at 309.
84.
Alexis de Tocqueville concluded in 1848 that “[n]evertheless, the
Europeans have not been able to change the character of the Indians entirely.” Id. at
310.
85.
GETCHES ET AL., supra note 10, at 192–94.
86.
John Collier was active from 1916 on in the National Community
Center movement. Professor Kevin Mattson argues that the organization “always
remained committed to community-based democracy.” KEVIN MATTSON, CREATING
A DEMOCRATIC PUBLIC: THE STRUGGLE FOR URBAN PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY
DURING THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 67 (1998).
According to Professor Jennings, Collier, later president of the American
Indian Defense Association, was “overwhelmed in a mystical way by the rituals of the
Pueblo Indians functioning in worship of nature.” JENNINGS, supra note 4, at 388.
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Indian Country of the Indian Reorganization Act (“IRA”) of 1934. 87 The
IRA, as viewed by Collier and Interior Secretary Harold Ickes, was a
logical extension of proven Progressivist principles of participatory
democracy into Indian Country. 88 Collier’s opportunity to revive tribalism
came on the heels of those twin evils of the early 1930s, the Great
Depression and the Dust Bowl in the American Midwest. Collier’s
“Indian New Deal,” like President Roosevelt’s “American New Deal,”
generally promised the revitalization of Indian Country through federal
economic and technical assistance to the devastated tribal communities.
Collier’s social re-engineering of Indian Country sought to
resymbolize tribes as constitutional democracies, entitled to a measure of
home rule on their respective reservations. By this device, he hoped to
make tribalism’s revival palatable to the American public. Collier was
convinced newly created tribal institutions—tribal constitutions, tribal
business councils and an awakened tribal electorate—would eventually
emancipate the Indian peoples from their dependence on the federal
government. 89 He had worked to empower other fragmented American
minorities—such as the Irish and the Italians in New York, Chicago,
Boston and elsewhere—by a strategy of emancipatory politics that
organized these groups into political, economic and cultural forces within
the larger American society. 90
However, Collier failed to recognize that, unlike the ethnically
new and solid immigrant groups, the Indian peoples had adapted their own
strategies to deal with their wardship status under federal administration.
Convincing the Indian peoples that tribal home rule was a preferable
alternative to BIA control was Collier’s biggest challenge in selling the
IRA to Indian Country. A tradition of passive Indian resistance to BIA
administration had defined a leadership tradition within Indian Country.
These home-grown Indian leaders were skeptical of Collier’s promise that
if they assumed the burdens of tribal decision-making, their decisions
would be respected by the federal government. 91
Collier presumed that many Indians, particularly the more
assimilated mixed-bloods, would eagerly embrace the IRA. 92 This view
87.
Pub. L. No. 73-383, 48 Stat. 984 (1934).
88.
JENNINGS, supra note 4, at 388–89.
89.
Id.
90.
Id.
91.
The IRA’s structure of tribal constitutions and elected tribal officials
conflicted with the traditions of many, if not most, tribes in which government has
been almost wholly hereditary. Id. at 388–89.
92.
Collier described this group of Indians as “mixed blood with a whiteplus psychology.” GRAHAM D. TAYLOR, THE NEW DEAL AND AMERICAN INDIAN
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was more than naive. He did not grasp that, as a result of the Indian
allotment programs and a lengthy period of BIA-rule, an interlocking set
of interests ruled contemporary Indian Country. Those non-Indian farmers
and ranchers who leased Indian lands constituted one such interest group.
They knew their Indian allottees and the BIA very well. They also knew
how to spread disinformation about the effect of the IRA on the allottees’
interests and thereby undermine Collier’s efforts to sell the IRA within
Indian Country. This influential interest group did not support Collier’s
goal of enhancing tribal decision-making if it threatened their economic
interests. 93
Ironically, many full-blood tribal leaders also distrusted the IRA’s
system of representative, elected tribal councils governed by written tribal
constitutions. They feared that traditional clan-based decision-making
would be eclipsed by these over-strong tribal institutions. 94 But Collier’s
instinctive judgment that his IRA would be supported by the bettereducated, assimilated tribal members proved to be true on some of the
reservations. They grasped the potential economic and social value of the
tribal offices created by the IRA, and they welcomed a voice, however
small, in their own affairs. 95
Collier also underestimated the BIA’s resistance to the IRA.
Through its “back channel” contacts in Congress, the BIA actively sought
to undermine and limit its implementation. 96
Finally, Collier
overestimated his personal ability to persuade recalcitrant tribes such as
the Navajo and the Crow to accept the IRA. 97 The Navajo sheep herders
were outraged by his heavy-handed efforts to reduce their herds within the
carrying capacity of their rapidly deteriorating range. The Crow feared
that the IRA would undermine their traditional governance based on a
general council system.
Assessing the IRA as an overall success or failure is not yet
possible. Many IRA tribes are now remaking their constitutions and
governments to better fit their evolving needs and their new
understandings of themselves as Indian peoples. 98 Tribal home rule, at

TRIBALISM 52 (1980). It is true that younger Indian men of mixed-blood ancestry
predominated on the new tribal councils. Id. at 51.
93.
Not surprisingly, non-Indian farmers and ranchers that leased Indian
allotments resisted their displacement by the tribal land consolidation and cooperative
efforts spurred by the IRA. Id. at 125.
94.
Id. at 39–62.
95.
Id.
96.
Id. at 149.
97.
Id. at 33, 128–29.
98.
JENNINGS, supra note 4, at 150.
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least as envisioned by Collier, still has not been realized on many Indian
reservations. Collier’s IRA applied a “lowest common denominator”
approach for the political development of indigenous peoples from the
Arctic Circle to the American Southwest. Stock tribal constitutions were
presented to guide the political development of radically divergent Indian
societies. 99 Not surprisingly, some critics of the IRA liken Collier to
Congressman Dawes: one sought to colonize tribalism with the idea of
individual property rights, while the other sought to colonize it with the
idea of constitutional democracy. Neither understood the depth and
pervasiveness of Indian resistance to their initiatives for the benefit of the
Indian peoples. 100
Collateral IRA provisions, such as those establishing Indian hiring
and promotion preferences within the BIA, have had the most impact. 101
These provisions helped leverage the creation of a new Indian professional
class: the Indian bureaucrat. Collier certainly would have applauded the
creation of this new class. It notched perfectly into Collier’s vision that
his IRA would reciprocally transform both the tribes and the federal
government. 102 The tribes, as they gained power and experience under the
IRA, would demand more and better performance from the BIA. The BIA,
as it progressively became more “Indianized,” would respond more
sensitively to the tribes’ demand for an enlarged decision-making role. 103
This hope likewise remains to be fully realized within Indian Country.
II. THE FAILED EFFORT TO EMANCIPATE THE AMERICAN
INDIAN PEOPLES
Federal Indian law has just emerged from its most recent dark
age—the 1950s and early 1960s—when tribes were required to bear
burdens, not exercise sovereign powers. 104 During that era many tribes
99.
Id. at 39–62.
100. Id.
101. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974). Professor David Williams
has become somewhat exercised over what he views as the potential hypocrisy of the
Mancari decision’s “tying [employment] benefits to this kind of racial calibration [of
one-fourth or more Indian blood that] has historically been associated with racism at
its most despicable.” GETCHES ET AL., supra note 10, at 243.
102. TAYLOR, supra note 92, at 39–62.
103. Id.
104. Professor Getches dates this “dark age” of Indian law from 1945 to
1961. He describes this era as follows:
A turnaround in congressional policy toward Indians resulted in the
dramatic departure from the reforms spearheaded by John Collier
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were terminated by federal action, 105 some were subjected to state
jurisdiction under Public Law 280, 106 and still others had their members
relocated to urban areas such as Denver, Chicago and the California Bay
Area. 107 Since that time tribes have sought to ride the crest of larger,
potentially emancipating movements such as the American civil rights
revolution of the 1960s and a series of pro-tribal judicial decisions in the
1970s to a new era of tribal self-determination. 108
A. The Origin of Tribal Self-Determination
Self-determination was introduced into the Indian Country
lexicon by President Richard Nixon’s 1970 Indian Message to

that began in the early 1940s. There were calls from Capitol Hill
to repeal the IRA and to move away from the encouragement of
tribal self-government as official federal policy.
Collier,
Commissioner of the BIA since 1933, resigned in 1945. . . . In
1949, the Hoover Commission issued its Report on Indian Affairs,
recommending an about-face in federal policy: “complete
integration” of the Indians should be the goal so that Indians would
move “into the population as full, taxpaying citizens.”
GETCHES ET AL., supra note 10, at 204.
105. Termination of tribal status was, for Senator Arthur V. Watkins who
led the pro-termination forces in 1953 in Congress, the means of “end[ing] the status
of Indians as wards of the government and grant[ing] them all the rights and
prerogatives pertaining to American citizenship.” Id. at 204–05.
106. This federal jurisdictional transfer statute, enacted in 1953, sought to
grant the United States’ criminal and civil jurisdictional responsibilities within Indian
Country to the states. Professor Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, the leading scholar on
Public Law 280, charitably characterized this statute's intent as a “compromise
between wholly abandoning the Indians to the states and maintaining them as federally
protected wards, subject to only federal or tribal jurisdiction.” Id. at 488; see also Pub.
L. No. 280 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1162 and 28 U.S.C. § 1360).
107. The BIA recognized the “economic carrying capacity” of the Indian
reservations would not provide suitable job opportunities for many young Indian men
and women, especially those trained in vocational and clerical skills at off-reservation
boarding schools. The BIA developed the relocation program in the 1950s and 1960s
as a means to get these Indian people to the supposed job opportunities within
America’s urban centers. GETCHES ET AL., supra note 10, at 204–24.
108. Professor Getches credits the Supreme Court of the late 1960s and
1970s with becoming the “defender of Indian rights,” and it was required to “decide
the extent to which residual legislation from an earlier era of policy should be enforced
and the degree to which contemporary policy should inform interpretation and
application of law.” Id. at 233–34.
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Congress. 109 He modified the phrase “self-determination,” however, by
adding tribal as an adjective. Nixon clearly sought a new foundation for
federal Indian law and policy. 110 That phrase has been extended to include
several sub-areas of tribal endeavor: tribal environmental selfdetermination; 111 tribal cultural self-determination; 112 and tribal economic
self-determination. 113 This new phraseology suggests that a fundamental
paradigm shift in federal Indian law has occurred.
But beyond relatively bland assertions, legal commentators have
offered remarkably little insight into the basic character, process and
purpose of tribal self-determination. What is needed is a critique that
renders tribal self-determination comprehensible, useful and, most
importantly, adaptable to the needs of the American Indian people. Thirty
years have passed since the formal initiation of the tribal selfdetermination era, so we must now step back and take stock of the tribal
progress made under its banner. To do so, we must examine both the selfdetermination and tribal components of Nixon’s famous phrase.
1. Evaluating the Self-Determination Component
Self-determination arguably encapsulates a distinct people’s
inherent right to self-governing status. This right ostensibly derives from
the contemporary interpretation of emerging international, human rights
and indigenous peoples’ law. 114 Read together, they hold that those core
attributes of a culture—language, religious beliefs and practices, as well
as the distinctive socio-economic arrangements—deserve respect under
domestic and international law. 115 Indeed, modern European history,
beginning in the sixteenth century, if not earlier, is largely a recounting of
109. President Nixon’s major goal in promoting tribal self-determination
was “to strengthen the Indian’s sense of autonomy without threatening his sense of
community.” Id. at 227.
110. Id. at 226–28.
111. See Rebecca Tsosie, Tribal Environmental Policy in an Era of SelfDetermination, 21 VT. L. REV. 225 (1996).
112. See Dean B. Suagee, Tribal Voices in Historic Preservation: Sacred
Landscapes, Cross-Cultural Bridges, and Common Ground, 21 VT. L. REV. 145
(1996).
113. See Tadd M. Johnson & James Hamilton, Self-Governance for Indian
Tribes: From Paternalism to Empowerment, 27 CONN. L. REV. 1251 (1995).
114. Professor James Anaya argues that “human beings, individually and
as groups, should be in control of their own destiny and that structures of government
should be devised accordingly.” S. James Anaya, Indigenous Rights Norms in
Contemporary International Law, 8 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1 (1991).
115. Id.
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the struggles of distinct peoples to achieve self-determining status. 116 This
struggle continues today as indigenous peoples the world over assert their
inherent and human right to self-determination. 117
But a distinct people’s inherent rights may be denied to them.
These rights may be held in “trust” for them by a more powerful,
colonizing nation. 118 Such was the experience of many of the indigenous
peoples of sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia during the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.119 The European trusteeship over
those indigenous peoples was described by Rudyard Kipling as the “white
man’s burden.” 120 Later, worn down by the burdens of colonial
administration and bankrupted by the horrendous costs of World War II,
most of these European colonial nations during the 1950s and 1960s
acceded to the demands of these indigenous peoples and restored their selfdetermining status. 121
Should President Nixon’s 1970 Indian Message be read as
restoring self-determining status to the Indian peoples? That depends on
how one reads the “tribal” adjective that modifies self-determination. That
modifier renders ambiguous the nature, scope and purpose of tribal selfdetermination.
2. Evaluating the ‘Tribal’ Component
I seek to measure the contemporary tribe’s potential for realizing
self-determination against the background constraints of federal Indian
law. I do so by focusing on the three most prominent tribal strategies for
realizing self-determination. First, tribes have sought to “morph” their
inherent and reserved treaty rights into tribal police powers throughout
Indian Country. 122 Second, tribes have sought both economic control over

116. Id.
117. Id.
118. GEORGE W. SHEPARD, JR., THE POWER SYSTEM AND BASIC HUMAN
RIGHTS: FROM TRIBUTE TO SELF-RELIANCE IN HUMAN RIGHTS AND THIRD WORLD
DEVELOPMENT 13–25 (George W. Shepard & Ved P. Nanda eds., 1985).
119. Kipling spoke of the Indian as “half savage and half child”—the
former requiring civilization and the latter socialization. ASHIS NANDY, TRADITIONS,
TYRANNY AND UTOPIAS: ESSAYS IN POLITICAL AWARENESS 58 (1987).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Tribes have naturally sought in the contemporary era, in Professor
Getches’ view, to “increase the reach and sophistication of their own governmental
powers over Indian Country.” GETCHES ET AL., supra note 10, at 556. But their efforts
to achieve reservation development and self-sufficiency has brought them into direct
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their lands and to use their competitive advantages so as to rebuild their
tribal economies. 123 Third, tribes have sought to reassert their cultural
identities as distinct peoples by securing constitutionally and statutorily
protected rights to the free exercise of their religious and social
practices. 124
I analyze these tribal strategies for self-determination within two
alternative contexts. First, I critique these strategies against the backdrop
of what I call the standard development model for Indian Country. I
conclude that this model holds promise only for that minority of tribes who
view wealth creation and accumulation as the essential feature of their
quest for self-determination. Second, I critique these strategies against the
backdrop of what I call the transcendent model of tribal self-determination.
conflict with the “states [who] continually seek to assert their jurisdictional power
over Indian Country.” Id. at 556.
This tribal versus state battle over “which government entity gets to receive
a stream of tax revenues or apply its land use ordinance on the reservation” will hinge
“on the jurisdictional principles of federal Indian law in an effort to resolve these
intense, high-stakes cross-cultural conflicts.” Id. at 556–57.
123. Stephen Cornell advocates for tribes to assert “de facto sovereignty”
as their means of achieving economic development within Indian Country. Id. at 721
(citing Stephen Cornell, Sovereignty, Prosperity and Policy in Indian Country Today,
5 COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT 5, 5–13 (1997)). His recommendation stems from a
Harvard study of the marketplace performance of over seventy-five tribes with
significant forest-based resources. This study’s results lead Cornell to conclude that
sovereignty is the primary development resource a tribe possesses. But this
sovereignty must be guided by institutional structures that ensure the separation of
politics from business, an effective professional tribal bureaucracy and the
constitutional separation of tribal governmental powers. Id. at 723–25.
124. In 1921, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs recommended the
continuing suppression of traditional American Indian religious and cultural practices:
The sun-dance, and all other similar dances and so-called religious
ceremonies are considered “Indian offences” under existing
regulations, and corrective penalties are provided. I regard such
restriction as applicable to any dance . . . which involves the
reckless giving away of property . . . frequent or prolonged periods
of any celebration . . . in fact any disorderly or plainly excessive
performance that promotes superstitious cruelty, licentiousness,
idleness, danger to health, and shiftless indifference to family
welfare.
GETCHES ET AL., supra note 10, at 754 (citing FELIX COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL
INDIAN LAW 175 (1992)). Contemporary Indian religious practitioners have invoked
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment as a means of preserving their
cultural and ceremonial access to sacred sites on the public lands. See Lyng v.
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
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I conclude that this approach likely holds greater promise for the majority
of tribes who view cultural and social revitalization as the essential feature
of their quest for self-determination.
B. My Critique of the Standard Model of Tribal Self-Determination
Tribal efforts to transform their inherent and treaty-reserved
powers into practical means for the realization of their self-determination
goals occasioned most of the Indian litigation of the past thirty years. 125
The working thesis that informs this tribal strategy conceives of
contemporary tribes as legitimate American governments, akin to nonIndian local and state governments. Therefore, denying a tribe the right to
exercise a particular governmental power must be justified by citation to a
specific treaty or statutory provision expressly limiting that tribe’s
governmental authority. 126 By this approach, tribes have sought to
persuade the federal courts, the executive branch and Congress to set a
place for them at the table of American governance.
The tribes’ efforts to transform themselves into fully-recognized
American governments have bumped up against the juridical limits
inherent in Chief Justice Marshall’s concept of the tribe. 127 Tribes
naturally have asserted their inherent and treaty-reserved powers as
constitutive of their identity as legitimate American governments. They
contend these powers must be judicially reinterpreted in a manner that
allows the Indian people to cope with their radically altered environments,
economies, welfare needs and social goals. 128 They also contend the
ancient and more recent organic documents—Marshall’s Indian law
decisions, treaties, agreements, executive orders and tribal constitutions or
codes—serve as enabling legislation empowering tribal governments to
enact those “necessary and proper” ordinances that will allow the Indian
people to adapt to their substantially changed circumstances. 129
However, the Supreme Court of the United States has recently
responded in blunt terms to this tribal strategy for self-determination. Put
simply, the Court now regards tribal governments as constitutively

125. See GETCHES ET AL., supra note 10, at 556–620.
126. Id.
127. Marshall’s concept of the tribe as a “domestic, dependent nation” has
been exploited by the modern Supreme Court to limit the governmental powers of
Indian peoples within Indian Country. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5
Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
128. GETCHES ET AL., supra note 10, at 531–55.
129. Id.
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different from, if not inferior to, state and local governments. 130 It is likely
that tribes will not be allowed to exercise their governmental powers in a
manner that competes with, or ostensibly threatens, the constitutionally
established rights and powers of those governments or their citizens. 131
1. The Limits of the Standard Model of Tribal Self-Determination
Tribal efforts to “cash-in” their inherent and treaty-reserved
powers into the currency of recognized police powers within Indian
Country have driven recent Indian litigation. The limits of this approach
to tribal self-determination are illustrated in these following analytic
sections.
a. Limiting Tribal Regulatory and Adjudicatory Authority Within Indian
Country
The resymbolizing of tribes as sovereign authorities within Indian
Country has attracted much attention from the courts, Congress, and state
and local governments. The tribes’ assertion of a wide-range of police
powers deemed essential to the realization of their sovereign interests has
generated a substantial non-Indian backlash. 132
130. Id.
131. The Seminole Tribe’s suit against Florida to enforce the good faith
negotiation provisions of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (“IGRA”) was dismissed
on state sovereign immunity grounds. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44
(1996) (5-4 decision) (Stevens, J., dissenting). This decision has crippled tribal efforts
to develop gaming enterprises that require a negotiated tribal-state compact as a basis
for commencing operations. Some constitutional scholars, such as Professor Martha
Field, mistakenly minimize the significance of this decision for tribal economic
development:
Seminole is probably not of major significance in regard to federalIndian-state relations. It is designed to be, and is, a major decision
about the meaning of the Eleventh Amendment and about federalstate relations, judicial and congressional. The decision obviously
affect the IGRA. But the scheme that replaces the one held
unconstitutional in Seminole could prove more advantageous to
Native Americans rather than less.
GETCHES ET AL., supra note 10, at 751 (citing Martha A. Field, The Seminole Case,
Federalism, and the Indian Common Cause, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 3, 3–4 (1997)).
Whatever “more advantageous scheme” Professor Field had in mind for Indian
gaming has yet to materialize.
132. GETCHES ET AL., supra note 10, at 531–55.
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Tribal self-determination demands, from the tribes’ viewpoint,
judicial endorsement of those tribally reserved police powers essential for
the growth and maturation of self-sustaining American Indian societies. 133
Tribes, from the late 1960s to the late 1970s, were somewhat successful in
persuading the federal courts to reinterpret their inherent and reserved
sovereign powers so as to meet their radically altered economic,
environmental and cultural circumstances. An impressive string of protribal judicial decisions during this era commemorated the apparent
success of this strategy. 134 However, the Supreme Court’s recent string of
anti-tribal decisions had revived Chief Justice Marshall’s view of tribes as
historically-determined entities severely limited in the nature and scope of
their reserved police powers within Indian Country. 135
b. The Supreme Court’s Response to the Tribes’ Assertion of Sweeping
Police Powers Within Indian Country
Justice Rehnquist’s opinion in Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe 136
revived Marshall’s juridical concept of the tribe as a historicallydetermined American government whose inherent powers were
substantially altered upon its incorporation into the United States. He
revived Marshall’s incorporation thesis by holding that Indian tribes had
been, early on in America’s history, divested of any inherent criminal
jurisdiction they may have once possessed over non-Indian defendants. 137
A brief analysis of the facts and holdings of that decision will
demonstrate the substantial limit imposed by the Court on the tribe’s
assertion of general police powers within Indian Country. Suquamish
tribal police arrested Mark David Oliphant, a non-member, during the
tribe’s annual Chief Seattle Days celebration, and charged him with
assaulting a tribal officer and resisting arrest. They also arrested another
non-member, David Belgarde, after a high-speed chase along the
reservation highways that ended when Belgarde collided with a tribal
police vehicle. He was later charged at arraignment with reckless
endangerment and damaging tribal property. 138
133. Id. at 556–620.
134. Id.
135. Tribal efforts to assert criminal and civil jurisdiction over nonIndians within Indian country prompted the Supreme Court to substantially limit the
circumstances under which these asserted tribal police powers may be exercised. Id.
at 531–55.
136. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
137. Id. at 208–11.
138. Id. at 194.
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The Port Madison Reservation, wherein the Suquamish people
reside, is located across the Puget Sound from Seattle. It is a checkerboard
of tribal trust land, allotted Indian land, property held in fee simple by nonIndians, and various roads and public highways maintained by Kitsap
County. 139 Both the federal district court and the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals upheld tribal criminal jurisdiction over these two non-member
defendants. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine
whether tribal courts have criminal jurisdiction over non-members in these
circumstances.
Rehnquist reasoned, as did Chief Justice Marshall earlier, that
Indian reservations are “part of the territory of the United States” and that
they “hold and occupy [the reservations] with the assent of the United
States,” and concluded that “by submitting to the overriding sovereignty
of the United States, Indian tribes therefore necessarily give up their power
to try non-Indian citizens of the United States except in a manner
acceptable to Congress.” 140
He likewise turned legal history on its head, citing dictum in a
famous pro-tribal Supreme Court 141 decision that immunized tribal Indians
from federal criminal jurisdiction, by arguing to allow Indian tribes to
criminally prosecute non-Indian defendants would:
[I]mpose upon [non-Indian defendants] the restraints of
an external and unknown code . . . , which judges them by
a standard made by others and not for them . . . [i]t tries
them, not by their peers, nor by the customs of their
people, nor the law of their land, but by . . . a different
race, according to the law of a social state of which they
have an imperfect conception. 142
His sketchy historical research regarding tribal criminal
jurisdiction was calculated to create what he described as a uniform
judicial and congressional understanding that tribes had been divested of
any inherent criminal jurisdiction over non-Indian defendants who may
violate their laws. 143 Tribes forever remain, for Rehnquist, the wolf-child,
treacherous and vengeful, seeking to inflict cruelty on any non-Indian who
139. Id. at 192–93.
140. Id. at 208–10 (quoting United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567,
571–72 (1846)).
141. Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 571 (1883).
142. Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 210–11 (quoting Ex
parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 571).
143. Id. at 193.
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may fall into their grasp. 144 Allowing tribes to exercise criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians who violate their laws would return America
to the unregulated tribal world, one lacking in reliable laws or procedures
for the protection of the individual liberties of non-Indians. 145
Given that the Oliphant decision dealt with the unique issues of
individual liberty and lacked citation to reliable precedent, most legal
commentators thought that its effect was limited to the criminal
jurisdiction arena. 146 They were soon proven wrong. Within a few years,
the Supreme Court demonstrated the virtually unbridled reach of the
Oliphant rationale by substantially limiting tribal civil regulatory
jurisdiction over non-Indians within Indian Country. 147 A brief analysis
of the facts and holdings of that decision illustrates the substantial limit
imposed on the tribes’ assertion of general regulatory powers within
Indian Country.
The Supreme Court’s 1981 decision in Montana v. United States
focused on the Crow tribe’s effort to regulate duck hunting and trout
fishing by non-Indians on fee-owned lands within the boundaries of the
Crow Reservation. 148 The lower court had upheld tribal regulatory power
as an incident of the inherent sovereignty of the Crow people.149 However,
Justice Stewart rejected that position by citing the Oliphant decision for
the “general proposition that the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian
tribe do not extend to the activities of non-members of the tribe.” 150
The Montana decision vitiates, but does not necessarily eliminate,
tribal police power over non-Indians who reside within Indian Country. It
does require a tribe to demonstrate, as the basis for tribal regulation of nonIndian activity on non-trust lands, that such activity “directly and
substantially” burdens a tribally-protected interest. 151 Hidden behind the
lines of the Montana decision is President Washington’s view of the Indian
peoples as innately vengeful “wolf-children,” given at any moment to
unpredictable and irrational action. Limited by the Montana and Oliphant
decisions, tribes can never mature into American governments worthy of

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id. at 195.
Id. at 196.
GETCHES ET AL., supra note 10, at 542–43.
Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
Id. at 547.
Id. at 550.
Id. at 565.
Id. at 548.
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being entrusted with general regulatory or adjudicatory jurisdiction within
their territories. 152
Tribes, after these two Supreme Court decisions, have
understandably sought different strategies for self-determination within
Indian Country. Some have embraced a tribal strategy of administrative
self-determination within Indian Country.
Building internal
administrative capabilities within tribal governments and preferentially
employing tribal members in relatively sophisticated and remunerative
jobs is a practical extension of John Collier’s earlier idea of Indian homerule within Indian Country. But it took President Nixon’s “jaw-boning”
of Congress to finally bring this vision to reality via the 1975 enactment
of the Indian Self-Determination Act (“ISDA”).
C. Building Tribal Administrative Capabilities Within Indian Country
The congressional response to President Nixon’s 1970 Indian
Message was to enact the ISDA. 153 It authorized the tribes to contract with
the Secretary of the Interior for the direct tribal administration of those
federally-funded Indian benefit programs presently run by the Bureau of
Indian Affairs (“BIA”) or the Indian Health Service (“IHS”). 154 As a
result, the ISDA was significantly amended in 1988 and 1994 and is now
popularly known as the Tribal Self-Governance Act (“TSGA”). 155 Tribes,
152. Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The
Hard Trail of Decolonizing and Americanizing the White Man’s Indian
Jurisprudence, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 219, 273–74.
153. 25 U.S.C. § 450(a)–(n) (2001).
154. GETCHES ET AL., supra note 10, at 226–230.
155. Tadd Johnson describes the congressional intent motivating the 1988
amendments to the ISDA:
The new Title featured a planning grant phase for twenty tribes.
The twenty tribes were then to negotiate compacts with the
Secretary of the Interior. The tribes were allowed to “plan,
conduct, consolidate, and administer programs, services, and
functions” of the Interior Department that were “otherwise
available to Indian tribes or Indians.” Under the terms of the
written agreements, tribes were authorized to “redesign programs,
activities, functions or services and reallocate funds of such
programs, activities or services.” The agreement was to specify the
services to be provided under the agreement and the procedures to
be used to reallocate funds. In essence, the Self-Governance
Demonstration Project allowed twenty Indian tribes to receive
funds in a large block grant from the Secretary of the Interior. It
allowed the Demonstration tribes to move money among programs
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now by contract or compact, can stand in the shoes of the BIA and IHS, or
other Interior Department agencies, so as to administer on their respective
reservations most of the federally-funded Indian benefit programs. 156
The ISDA’s seeming assumption is that by baby-steps, tribes can
move towards self-determination. It carries out this assumption by
providing financial incentives to those tribes that are willing to
departmentalize and professionalize their staffs and administrative
structures. Tribal self-determination, by this reckoning, will grow out of
an increasingly sophisticated, rationalized tribal bureaucracy. 157 Some
tribes have taken this development path by opting to virtually take over
the BIA’s and IHS’s programs on their reservations. This approach has
quickly yielded visible evidence of tribal self-determination, according to
its advocates, by the increased employment of tribal members, through
tribal preferences for hiring and promoting tribal members into tribal
administrative and staff positions.
Furthermore, these ISDA advocates argue that by empowering
tribes to design and develop their own reservation programs, better quality
as well as the power to actually prioritize spending, as opposed to
the shadow prioritizing process that characterized the IPS. In
general, Self-Governance gave tribes the power to make choices
and be responsible for their choices.
Tadd M. Johnson & James Hamilton, Self-Governance for Indian Tribes: From
Paternalism to Empowerment, 27 CONN. L. REV. 1251, 1267–68 (1995). He describes
the 1994 amendments to the ISDA as “incremental self-governance” that, “[w]hile
‘grandfathering’ all of the Demonstration tribes . . . provides for participation of only
twenty new tribes each year.” Id. at 1270.
He describes the major changes wrought by the 1994 amendments as
including annually negotiated “funding agreements” between the Interior Department
and the Self-Governance tribes that contemplate that “all [DOI] programs are eligible
for tribal administration under the funding agreement.” Id. at 1270–71. Tribes thus
have the opportunity to assume control of “non-BIA activities on or near their
reservations.” Id. at 1272.
156. Id.
157. Some legal commentators see the Indian Self-Determination Act of
1975 as initiating a process of “tribalization.” He describes it as follows:
“Tribalization,” as coined herein, refers to the process by which
resources dedicated to administering and implementing Indian
programs are removed from the Bureau of Indian Affairs personnel
and placed directly in the hands of tribal governments. The tribal
governments then have authority to perform tasks formerly
reserved for the Federal trustee.
Id. at 1252.
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goods and services will be delivered to the Indian peoples. Moreover,
individual tribal members will be spurred to educationally and
professionally invest in their talents and gain the required degrees or skills
certifications that will enable them to take advantage of these enlarged
tribal employment opportunities. 158
But the ISDA, despite its admittedly positive influences in
incrementally adding tribal jobs and administrative capabilities, cannot
serve as an adequate approach to tribal self-determination. The reason is
threefold. First, tribal self-determination fails to define a core set of legal
attributes that places tribes on par with other recognized American
governments. 159 The ISDA, by this reckoning, contributes almost nothing
to the growth of tribes as self-determining entities. Instead, the ISDA
expressly limits tribes to administering narrowly defined statutory
functions. These statutory limitations require the tribes to deliver the
same, or similar, bundles of goods and services as the IHS or BIA would
have provided to eligible Indian beneficiaries. 160
Second, this new relationship between ostensibly self-determining
tribes and federal government has produced troubling evidence of federal
intrusion into internal tribal decision-making. 161
Some western
congressmen, such as former Senator Slade Gorton, have sought to punish
those tribes who exercise their treaty reserved rights by refusing them their
self-determination funding. 162 Viewed in this light, the ISDA serves to
potentially constrain, rather than promote, tribal self-determination. Most
tribes do have a fairly realistic view of the ISDA’s promise and process.
They do not view it as the royal road to self-determination. They do view
it as an instrument to promote tribal employment and development within
Indian Country. 163
Tribal administrative development cannot be meaningfully
equated with tribal self-determination. For this reason, tribes have
understandably sought out other subject matter areas for the meaningful
expression of their peoples’ power and identity. Tribes have successfully
built on the largely anecdotal evidence of their wise stewardship of their
lands and resources as the basis for asserting exclusive jurisdiction over
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Professor Getches cites efforts by some western congressmen to
legislatively curtail tribes’ inherent and treaty-reserved powers as evidence of a nonIndian backlash against tribes’ self-determination efforts. GETCHES ET AL., supra note
10, at 152.
162. Id. at 739–42.
163. Johnson & Hamilton, supra note 113, at 1278–79.
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environmental resources within Indian Country. Surprising allies have
rallied in support of their efforts, including President Reagan in 1983 and
the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) in 1984. Will the tribe
enjoy success in building an ethic of tribal environmental selfdetermination?
D. Tribes as States Under Federal Environmental Statutes
Resymbolizing “tribes as states” (“TAS”) is the new and highlytouted approach to enhancing tribal authority over environmental
resources located within Indian Country. 164 It was another Republican
President, Ronald Reagan, who spurred the development of this approach.
It was his 1983 Indian Policy Statement—directing all federal executive
agencies, not just the Interior Department, to develop government-togovernment relationships with those tribes within their respective
jurisdictions—that effectively launched the TAS era. 165 Two tribal selfdetermination strategies derived from President Reagan’s directive merit
assessment.

164. Congress amended several federal environmental statutes to enable
the EPA to treat tribes as states for the purposes of administering the following
program functions: (1) Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f to 300j-26 (1988)
(the EPA may treat tribes for all programs contained in statute); (2) Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675
(Supp. IV 1992) (the EPA may enter into cooperative agreements with tribes to carry
out the Superfund’s purposes); (3) Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (1988)
(the EPA may treat tribes as for most regulatory purposes); and, (4) Clean Air Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671g (1990) (the EPA may treat tribes as states for the purposes of
the Act).
The Clean Water Act’s TAS amendment enables tribes to assume regulatory
control over reservation water sources for specific program purposes. See 33 U.S.C.
§ 1377(e) (1988). They may qualify for grants for pollution control programs or
construction of treatment facilities. They may also act to establish water quality
standards and assume the implementation of a permit system to enforce those
standards. But the Act requires the applicant tribal government to possess a governing
body that carries out substantial governmental duties and powers, and limits any
tribe’s assumed functions to the management of water resources “within the borders
of an Indian reservation” owned by, or held in trust for, a tribe or individual Indian.
See John L. Williams, The Effect of EPA’s Designation of Tribes as States on the Five
Civilized Tribes in Oklahoma, 29 TULSA L.J. 345, 347–51 (1993).
165. Id. at 346.
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1. The Administrative Origin of the TAS Strategy
Some executive agencies responded more fulsomely than others
to President Reagan’s 1983 Indian Policy Statement. The EPA
promulgated its 1984 Indian Environmental Policy (“IEP”) as a means of
redefining its relationship with tribes throughout the United States. 166
Administrator William Riley’s 1991 restatement of the IEP policy clearly
addresses tribal environmental self-determination:
The Agency will, in making decisions on program
authorization and other matters where jurisdiction over
reservation pollution sources is critical, apply federal law
as found in the U.S. Constitution, applicable treaties and
statutes and federal Indian law. Consistent with the EPA
Indian Policy and the interest of administrative clarity, the
Agency will view Indian reservations as single
administrative units for regulatory purposes. Hence as a
general rule, the agency will authorize a tribe or state
government to manage reservation programs only where
that government can demonstrate adequate jurisdiction
over pollution sources throughout the reservation.
Where, however, a tribe cannot demonstrate jurisdiction
over one or more of the reservation sources, the Agency
will retain enforcement primary for those resources. Until
EPA formally authorizes a state or tribal program, the
Agency retains full responsibility for program
management. Where the EPA retains such responsibility,
it will carry out its duties in accordance with the principles
set forth in the EPA Indian policy. 167
This pragmatically-based EPA policy thus favors tribal
environmental self-determination for sound administrative and regulatory
reasons. While it does contemplate the eventual tribal administration of
most, if not eventually all, reservation-based environmental programs, it
does so to promote the overriding federal environmental interests
embodied in the governing environmental laws. While the EPA’s Indian
policy does promote a tribal voice in determining the future environmental

166. Id.
167. Id.; see Federal, Tribal and State Roles in the Protection of the
Reservation Environment, A Concept Paper Accompanying A Memorandum from
Mr. William Reilly, Administrator, EPA (July 10, 1991).

SOVEREIGN BARGAINS PROOF (Do Not Delete)

2017

9/9/2017 12:05 PM

TRIBES AS RICH NATIONS

161

character of their tribal homelands, it does so as a strategy to achieve the
overarching goals of federal environmental law.168
Congress statutorily ratified and extended EPA’s Indian policy via
its enactment in 1987 of several TAS amendments to the major
environmental statutes. Indian tribes, like states, are to work cooperatively
with the EPA to accomplish the federally-established environmental
goals. 169 The TAS amendments authorized the EPA to promote—through
the provision of grant assistance and technical support—the tribal
governments’ development of their administrative capabilities to regulate
reservation-based environmental resources. 170

168. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals used this rationale to uphold an
Indian pueblo’s ceremonial use designation of Rio Grande waters as against an
Establishment Clause challenge by the city of Albuquerque. The court concluded the
“EPA’s purpose in approving the designated use is unrelated to the Isleta Pueblo’s
religious reason for establishing it” and that such a designation “serves a clear secular
purpose: promotion of the goals of the Clean Water Act.” City of Albuquerque v.
Browner, 97 F.3d 415, 428 (10th Cir. 1996).
169. The EPA’s statement is explicit in this regard:
The Agency will, in making decisions on program authorization
and other matters where jurisdiction over reservation pollution
sources is critical, apply federal law as found in the U.S.
Constitution, applicable treaties, statutes and federal Indian law.
Consistent with the EPA Indian Policy and the interests of
administrative clarity, the agency will view Indian reservations as
single administrative units for regulatory purposes. Hence as a
general rule, the agency will authorize a tribal or state government
to manage reservation programs only where that government can
demonstrate adequate jurisdiction over pollution sources
throughout the reservation. Where, however, a tribe cannot
demonstrate jurisdiction over one or more reservation sources, the
agency will retain enforcement primacy for those sources. Until
EPA formally authorizes a state or tribal program, the agency
retains full responsibility for program management. Where EPA
retains such responsibility, it will carry out its duties in accordance
with the principles set forth in the EPA Indian policy.
Raymond Cross, When Brendale Met Chevron: The Role of the Federal Courts in the
Construction of an Indian Environmental Law, 1 GREAT PLAINS NAT. RESOURCES J.
1, 11 (1996) (on file with author).
170. Williams, supra note 164, at 346–47.
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2. EPA’s Adoption of the “Direct and Substantial” Effect Test as the
Regulatory Basis for Awarding TAS Status
Given the tribes’ role in carrying out federal environmental policy
within Indian Country, the EPA’s recent interpretive rule implementing
section 518(e) of the Clean Water Act (“CWA”) appears all the more
puzzling. 171 It fundamentally undermines the TAS approach to tribal
environmental self-determination. It does so by expressly incorporating
the “second prong” of the Montana test into the basis for tribal regulation
of non-Indian activities that affect the reservation’s waters. The EPA
characterized that decision as allowing the tribe to regulate non-member
conduct on fee lands within the reservation only if that conduct has a direct
effect on tribal health and welfare.172
The EPA likewise incorporated the Supreme Court’s 1989 holding
in Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation 173
into its interpretive rule. That decision was read by the EPA as holding
that only the “direct and substantial” impact of a non-member’s activities
on a protected tribal interest will justify the tribal regulation of those
activities on fee lands within the reservation. Despite its characterization
of the Court’s opinion in Brendale as “deeply splintered” and expressing
no clear rule for determining the scope of inherent tribal jurisdiction over
non-members’ activities, the EPA nonetheless incorporated its holding
into its interpretive rule.

171. The EPA’s interpretive rule permits a tribal applicant to demonstrate
that it has jurisdiction over non-members’ activities on fee lands by showing that their
activities on those lands may imperil the tribe’s political integrity, economic security,
or health and welfare in a serious and substantial manner. The EPA’s rule further
presumes that tribal applicants will generally be able to meet this standard. 40 C.F.R.
§§ 131.1–.8 (2001) [hereinafter “EPA Rule” ].
172. The EPA’s interpretive rule inexplicably ignores the provision in
section 518(e) that points out that the purpose of TAS status is to protect those “water
resources held by an Indian tribe . . . [or] . . . held by the United States in trust for
Indians.” The statutorily recognized trust status of these water resources should
effectively preclude the EPA’s adoption of its “territorial analysis” that focuses on the
scope of inherent tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians on fee status lands within Indian
Country. This federal trust duty to protect Indian waters from injury is, of course, an
independent obligation of the EPA and does not depend on the nature and scope of
inherent tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians within Indian County. This statutory
provision recognizing the trust status of these reservation waters is nowhere addressed
in the EPA’s rule making. Id.
173. 492 U.S. 408 (1989) (holding that Yakima Nation has zoning
authority as to lands owned by nonmembers of tribe in Yakima reservation's “closed
area,” but not as such lands in reservations “open area”).
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A brief recounting of the factual structure underlying the Court’s
deeply splintered holding in Brendale demonstrates why the EPA was
mistaken in its action. The Yakima Indian Reservation is located in the
southeastern part of the state of Washington. Of the 1.3 million acres of
reservation land, approximately 80% is held in federal trust status on
behalf of the Yakima Nation or individual tribal members. The remaining
20% is owned in fee by Indian or non-Indian landowners. Most of the fee
land is located in Toppenish, Wapato and Harrah, three incorporated towns
located in the northeastern part of the reservation. 174
The parties and the lower courts regarded the reservation as
divided into “opened” and “closed” portions. The closed or “Indian” area
of the reservation consists of the western two-thirds of the reservation and
is predominantly forest land. The overwhelming majority of the 740,000
acres of land in that area is held in tribal trust. The open area of the
reservation is primarily rangeland, agricultural land, and residential and
commercial land. Almost half of the land in the open area is held in fee
status. 175
The Yakima Nation adopted its zoning ordinance in 1970 and
amended it to its present form in 1972. It applies to all lands within the
Yakima Indian Reservation including fee lands owned by Indians or nonIndians. Yakima County adopted a comprehensive zoning ordinance in
1972. That county ordinance applies to all real property within the county
boundaries, except for Indian trust lands. It established a number of use
districts which generally govern agricultural, residential, commercial,
industrial, and forest watershed uses. The particular zoning designations
at issue in this case are the forest watershed and general rural designations.
A non-tribal member, Philip Brendale, owned a 160-acre parcel
of land near the center of the closed area of the reservation. It is zoned as
a “reservation restricted” area by the Yakima Nation and as “forest
watershed” by Yakima County. Brendale submitted a subdivision
proposal to Yakima County requesting that he be allowed to divide his 20acre parcel into ten 2-acre summer cabin sites. However, the proposed
subdivision was not allowable under the Yakima Nation ordinance. 176
Another non-tribal member, Stanley Wilkinson, owned a 40-acre
parcel of land in the open area of the reservation, on a slope overlooking
the county airport, less than a mile from the northern boundary of the
reservation. The land is zoned as agricultural by the Yakima Nation and
as general rural by Yakima County. In 1983 Wilkinson applied to the
county for permission to subdivide 32 acres of his land into twenty lots for
174.
175.
176.

Id. at 415.
Id. at 416.
Id. at 418.
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single family homes. The Yakima Nation ordinance would not have
allowed this proposed subdivision. 177
The Yakima Nation challenged both of these proposed
developments in federal district court. It sought a declaratory judgment
that the Yakima Nation had exclusive authority to zone the properties in
question and an injunction barring county approval of any proposed
developments inconsistent with the Yakima Nation’s zoning ordinance. 178
A deeply divided Court upheld the Yakima Nation’s power to
zone the Brendale’s property while denying it the power to zone the
Wilkinson’s property. The “swing opinion” of Justices Stevens and
O’Connor distinguished between the “closed” and “opened” areas of the
reservation. The two justices reasoned that the undeniably “Indian”
character of the closed portion of the reservation authorized the Yakima
Nation to “prevent the few individuals who own portions of the closed area
in fee from undermining its general plan to preserve the character of this
unique resource.” 179 By the same token, they reasoned that the Yakima
Nation lacked the authority to regulate land use within the open portion of
the reservation. According to Stevens and O’Connor, non-Indian use of
the opened lands had “produced an integrated community that is not
economically or culturally delimited by reservation boundaries.” 180 This
factor, coupled with the tribe’s lack of power to exclude non-members
from that area, caused the two justices to hold that the Yakima Nation
“lacks the power to define the essential character of the territory.” 181
Their swing opinion in Brendale has been criticized as
establishing an undefinable and potentially racist test for when a portion
of an Indian reservation has lost its “Indian character” and is therefore
beyond tribal regulatory control. 182 Nonetheless, the EPA seized on the
177. Id.
178. Id. at 419.
179. Id. at 441 (Stevens, J., concurring).
180. Id. at 444.
181. Id. at 444–45.
182. Professor Joseph Singer has criticized the Brendale decision as
establishing Indians as a disadvantaged “racial caste”:
The Supreme Court has assumed in recent years that although nonIndians have the right to be free from political control by Indian
nations, American Indians can and should be subject to the political
sovereignty of non-Indians.
This [disparity] is not the result of neutral rules being applied in a
manner that has a disparate impact. Rather, it is the result of
formally unequal rules. Moreover, it can be explained only by
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Brendale decision as modifying its rule-making powers under section
518(e) of the CWA. It extracted from that decision the “substantial effect”
test that it interpolated into its final interpretive rule governing the
administrative grant of TAS status to applicant tribes.
Why the EPA chose to incorporate these fundamentally flawed
anti-tribal holdings as the basis for its TAS administration, I have
criticized elsewhere. 183 By its interpretive rule, a tribe that seeks
reservation-wide water quality jurisdiction must now meet an
administrative version of the “direct and substantial” effect test. NonIndian fee land owners, joined by state and local governments, have
challenged the EPA’s TAS designations under this interpretive rule as
arbitrary and legally invalid under the Court’s Montana and Brendale
decisions. 184
The recent decision by the Ninth Circuit, albeit upholding the
EPA’s TAS designation for the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes,
illustrates the undermining of tribal authority to protect their reservation
waters, as well as the EPA’s expertise in ensuring the wise administration
of the environmental policies embodied in the CWA. 185 While upholding
the challenged TAS designation, the Ninth Circuit denied any Chevron
deference to the EPA’s interpretative rule upon which the TAS designation
was based. 186 The court agreed with the appellant, the State of Montana,
on this point:
We agree with appellants insofar as they contend that the
scope of inherent tribal authority is a question of law for
which EPA is entitled to no deference. EPA’s decision to

reference to perhaps unconscious racist assumptions about the
nature and distribution of both property and power. This fact
implies an uncomfortable truth: both property rights and political
power in the United States are associated with a system of racial
caste.
Joseph William Singer, Sovereignty and Property, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 4–5 (1991).
183. Cross, supra note 169.
184. See Montana v. EPA, 137 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 1998).
185. The State of Montana opposed the EPA’s granting of TAS status to
the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation to the extent
that such status would extend to reservation land and surface waters owned in fee by
non-members of the tribes. The EPA approved the tribe’s application after
determining that the tribes possessed inherent authority over non-members on fee
lands. Montana then sued the EPA over this allegedly illegal agency action. Id. at
1140.
186. Id.
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adopt inherent tribal authority as the standard intended by
Congress may well be viewed in a deferential light
because the statute’s language and legislative history
were not entirely clear. EPA’s delineation of the scope of
that standard, however, has nothing to do with its own
expertise or with any need to fill interstitial gaps in the
statute committed to its regulation. Therefore, EPA’s
delineation of the scope of tribal inherent authority is not
entitled to deference. 187
Future federal district court judges may therefore engage in de
novo judicial review of the alleged adverse effects on non-Indian
governmental or economic interests occasioned by the EPA’s future TAS
designations. Given that on many of the Great Plains’ Indian reservations,
non-Indian settlement and economic development has rendered the
resident Indians a dispossessed minority within their own homelands,
those judges will be sorely tempted to disagree with the wisdom of the
EPA’s TAS designations. By giving the “direct and substantial” effect test
of Montana and Brendale undue currency within the environmental arena,
the EPA has rendered the TAS strategy of problematic value to those many
Indian people who reside in a deeply subordinated economic and landowning status on their own reservations. 188
The promise of the TAS strategy as a means for tribal
environmental self-determination has been unduly compromised by the
EPA’s interpretation of section 518(e) of the CWA. It is not surprising
that many tribes have looked beyond the environmental realm in their
search for meaningful opportunities for tribal self-determination. It is also
not surprising that some tribes have focused on the tribal cultural selfdetermination arena as the most appropriate forum for expression of their
peoples’ identities and interests. Can tribes realize cultural selfdetermination and build an ethic of cultural heritage that will be respected
and enforced by the federal courts?
E. Tribal Efforts to Build an Ethic of Cultural Heritage
Tribal cultural self-determination is the most recent forum of
conflict between Indians and non-Indians for control of new statutorilydenominated cultural resources called “cultural patrimony” 189 and
187. Id.
188. Cross, supra note 169.
189. Professor Dean Suagee characterizes cultural patrimony as
“refer[ing] to objects which have such cultural importance that they are considered the
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“traditional cultural properties.” 190 The new conflicts range from
competition over non-Indian recreational and Indian cultural uses of
public lands to a ferocious battle for control of ancient human remains
between non-Indian scientists and culturally affiliated tribes. 191
These new cultural preservation concepts represent a remarkable
departure from past historic preservation efforts that were largely directed
at protecting American Indian cultural resources because of their utility to
non-Indian scientific and aesthetically-interested communities.192 None
of these earlier preservation laws provided for tribal participation in the
identification, planning or administration of federal programs or projects
that have significant impact on American Indian cultural resources.193
Only recently have public land managers come to grips with their
obligations to work and consult with affected American Indian
communities in carrying out project-related activities affecting American
Indian historic and cultural resources. Tribal governments and Indian user
groups had historically been marginalized in agency-sponsored projects or
planning activities affecting their historic or cultural resources.

inalienable property of a tribe or group, not subject to ownership or alienation by
individual members of the tribe or group.” Dean B. Suagee, Tribal Voices in Historic
Preservation: Sacred Landscapes, Cross-Cultural Bridges, and Common Ground, 21
VT. L. REV. 145, 204 (1996); see also Native American Graves Protection and
Repatriation Act (NAGPRA), Pub. L. No. 101-601, 104 Stat. 3048 (codified at 25
U.S.C. § 3001(3)(D) (2001)).
190. “In carrying out [its] responsibilities under [section 106], a Federal
Agency shall consult with any Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian organization that
attaches cultural or religious significance to” a property that is listed on or eligible for
the National Register. National Historic Preservation Act of 1996 § 106(d)(6), 16
U.S.C. § 470(d)(6) (2001). Professor Suagee points to the 1996 proposed rules
requiring a federal agency to consult with the relevant tribe or Native Hawaiian
organization in the identification of historic properties, assessment of adverse effects
and resolution of adverse effects, and, in the event of a failure to resolve adverse
effects, the tribe or Native Hawaiian organization would have the same opportunities
as the State Historic Preservation Officer (SHPO) to participate in the process through
which the Advisory Council would provide comments to the agency. See Saugee,
supra note 189, at 185.
191. Bonnichsen v. United States, Dep’t of Army, 969 F. Supp. 628 (D.
Or. 1997).
192. Raymond Cross & Elizabeth Brenneman, Devils Tower At The
Crossroads: The National Park Service and the Preservation of Native American
Cultural Resources in the 21st Century, 18 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 5, 11–
14 (1997).
193. Id. at 17.
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1. The Impact of the Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass’n v. Babbitt 194
Decision on American Indian Cultural Resources Law
Recent litigation has focused on a federal land manager’s
implementation of her newly imposed statutory preservation duty to
preserve the living cultures of contemporary American Indian
communities. 195 In February 1995, the National Park Service issued its
Final Climbing Management Plan (“FCMP”) for Devils Tower in response
to the tremendous increase in the rate of recreational rock climbing and
the corresponding need to protect the site’s resources from degradation.
The FCMP included the following provisions: no new bolts or fixed pitons
will be allowed on the tower; access trails are to be rehabilitated;
camouflaged climbing equipment will be required; and certain routes will
be closed seasonally to protect raptor nesting. It also discontinued the
award of commercial climbing licenses for the month of June and
encouraged recreational climbers to refrain from climbing during June due
to the cultural importance of this month to the northern plains Indian tribes.
No restrictions were imposed on the general visiting public, who may
continue to use the site even during the month of June. Only commercial
climbers that hold revocable licenses granted by the Superintendent were
mandatorily restricted during the month of June under the FCMP. 196
Superintendent Deborah Liggett was the moving force behind the FCMP,
and not surprisingly, her action provoked legal challenge, 197 disrupting the
climbing management plan for Devils Tower one year into its operation.
This litigation, brought by several commercial and private rock
climbing interests, challenged the FCMP as a constitutionally barred
194. 2 F. Supp. 2d 1448 (D. Wyo. 1998). Judge William Downes granted
an injunction against the National Park Service forcing it to issue commercial climbing
permits.
195. Devils Tower was determined eligible for the National Register of
Historic Places as a traditional cultural property for its American Indian relationships.
A traditional cultural property is protected “because of its association with cultural
practices or beliefs of a living community that (a) are rooted in that community’s
history and (b) are important in maintaining the continuing cultural identity of the
community.” Cross & Brenneman, supra note 192, at 9. The Superintendent of Devils
Tower took action to list Devils Tower in compliance with Congress’ mandate to
preserve Native American cultural use of Devils Tower as a “historical, architectural
or [site of] cultural significance at the community, state or local level.” Id. at 17 n.47
(alteration in original).
196. Id. at 26.
197. “Superintendent Liggett’s action was taken in compliance with
Congress’ mandate to preserve American Indian cultural use of Devils Tower as a
‘historic, architectural or [site of] cultural significance at the community, state or local
level.’” Id. at 17 n.47 (alteration in original).
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governmental establishment of religion in favor of American Indian
religious users of Devils Tower. My analysis focuses on the district court
proceedings in which the court found for the plaintiffs and granted an
injunction against the implementation of the June closure provision of the
FCMP. 198 The plaintiffs claimed that the June commercial climbing
closure constituted a “subsidy of the Indian religion” and “an excessive
governmental entanglement with religion” in violation of the
Establishment Clause. Judge Downes agreed with the climbers in granting
their requested injunction, ruling that the prohibition of commercial
climbing during June violated the Establishment Clause. Superintendent
Liggett’s expressed intention to close Devils Tower to all rock climbing,
private and commercial, if voluntary private compliance with the FCMP
failed to significantly reduce non-commercial climbing, in Judge Downes’
opinion, amounted to government coercion of individual conduct in favor
of American Indian religious activities. 199
Because I have criticized elsewhere Judge Downes’ reasoning in
this matter, 200 I focus here on the impact of his decision on the power of
federal land managers to reasonably accommodate American Indians’
cultural uses of public lands. By characterizing the American Indians’
cultural uses of Devils Tower as religious in character, and by distorting
the religious accommodation principle expressed in Lyng v. Northwest
Indian Cemetery Protection Ass’n, 201 Judge Downes construed the June
198. Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass’n v. Babbit (D. Wyo. Jun. 1996) (order
granting, in part, Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction), at 11 (on file with
author).
199. The National Park Service revised its climbing management plan and
excised its ban on commercial climbing before trial was held before Judge Downes.
Given that excision of the ban on commercial climbing, Judge Downes dismissed the
climbers’ lawsuit challenging the new “voluntary climbing ban” as coercive and an
unconstitutional endorsement of Indian religious beliefs and practices. See Bear
Lodge Multiple Use Ass’n v. Babbitt, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1448 (D. Wyo. 1998).
In a sad denouncement of this matter, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
upheld the Park Service’s reliance on the climbers self-regulation, a new educational
program to motivate climbers to comply, and a sign that requests visitors to stay on
the trail around the Tower. See Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass’n v. Babbitt, 173 F.3d
814, 819 (10th Cir. 1999).
200. See Cross & Brenneman, supra note 192, at 25–26.
201. 485 U.S. 439 (1988). Scott Hardt argues that the Lyng decision
discriminates against Indian religious practitioners:
By focusing on the form of impact the challenged government
action creates, rather than the impairment of religious exercise, the
Court has drawn a line that discriminates against American Indian
religious practitioners. As a result of the free exercise analysis
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closure of Devils Tower to commercial rock climbing as a violation of the
Establishment Clause. By equating all American Indian cultural activities
as religiously motivated conduct, he effectively abolished land managers’
authority to carry out their cultural preservation duties expressed in
statutes such as the National Historic Preservation Act (“NHPA”). 202
2. Tribal Cultural Self-Determination After the Bear Lodge Decision
Coupling Judge Downes’ Bear Lodge decision, conflating all
American Indian cultural practices into religiously motivated beliefs, with
the Lyng Court’s reduction of the religious accommodation command of
the Free Exercise Clause to mere advisory guidance, leaves federal land
managers with very little incentive or authority to preserve American
Indians’ cultural access to their sacred resources and sites on public
lands. 203
But “baby steps” toward cultural self-determination may be
possible within the interstices of governing federal laws. For example, the
1992 “Indian” amendments to the NHPA require federal land management
activities affecting “traditional cultural properties” to be “carried out in
consultation with the affected tribes.” 204 Federal courts have held that
these procedural protections of American Indian cultural resources must
be scrupulously observed by federal land managers. 205 No doubt the lives
of public land managers are complicated by these new procedural duties,
but faithful adherence to the tribal consultation requirements provides the
Indian peoples with an opportunity to influence federal project activities
that impact access to their traditional sacred sites. Only now are federal
developed by the Supreme Court, persons practicing Western
religious traditions are protected from even relatively minor
burdens on their religious practices, while American Indians are
not protected from government action that essentially destroy
religious traditions.
Scott Hardt, The Sacred Public Lands: Improper Line Drawing in the Supreme
Court’s Free Exercise Analysis, 60 U. COLO. L. REV. 601, 657 (1989).
202. See Cross & Brenneman, supra note 192, at 33–39.
203. Id. at 33–36.
204. Id. at 18–19.
205. Stern and Slade describe the NHPA, as not an “action forcing”
statute, but as imposing procedural duties on the National Park Service (“NPS”) and
similarly situated federal agencies to promote the preservation of identified cultural
and historic resources. They conclude that the federal courts have interpreted these
duties as mandatory in nature. See Walter E. Stern & Lynn H. Slade, Effects of
Historic and Cultural Resources and Indian Religious Freedom on Public Lands
Development: A Practical Primer, 35 NAT. RESOURCES J. 133, 139–40 (1995).
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land managers coming to grips with their obligations to consult and work
with affected American Indian communities in preserving traditional
cultural properties. 206
Consultation with affected tribes likewise drives the cultural
preservation goals of the Native American Graves Protection and
Repatriation Act (“NAGPRA”). 207 Federal museums must now inventory
their American Indian collections and notify affected tribes of any human
remains or artifacts derived from an affiliated tribal culture. Affected
tribes may request their return for appropriate tribal administration.
Likewise, NAGPRA provides for the repatriation of “discovered”
American Indian remains and associated artifacts found on federal lands
to the closest culturally affiliated tribe. 208
While these new federal cultural preservation duties do contribute
to tribal cultural self-determination, they do not forcefully establish an
ethic of cultural heritage which will authoritatively resolve disputes
between non-Indian and tribal interests in cultural resources. 209
Understandably, some tribes have looked beyond the realm of tribal
cultural self-determination in an effort to locate entrepreneurial
opportunities for the meaningful expression of their peoples’ talents and
resources. Can these entrepreneurial tribes lead their Indian peoples to the
promised land of economic self-determination?

206. Public land management agencies, particularly the National Park
Service and U.S. Forest Service, are seeking to develop genuine working relationships
with affected Native American communities to identify and protect traditional cultural
properties. For example, Superintendent Liggett created a Devils Tower working
group that included affected Native American communities, representatives of the
recreational climbing community, local government, and economic interests. Her
actions represent one public land manager’s effort to comply with the broadened
consultation requirement of the NHPA. See Cross & Brenneman, supra note 192, at
18.
207. Pub. L. No. 101-601, 104 Stat. 3048 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001–
3013 (1994)).
208. Professor Suagee characterizes NAGPRA as “establish[ing] a legal
regime to protect human remains and other cultural items located on tribal lands and
federal lands.” Suagee, supra note 189, at 203.
209. A forceful ethic of cultural heritage would “view cultural heritage as
an issue of cultural, ethnic, or in some cases minority rights, and as one of the keys to
cultural preservation and self-determination.” Sarah Harding, Value, Obligation and
Cultural Heritage, 31 AZ. ST. L.J. 291, 301 (1999). By that view, “the disposition of
cultural heritage should be determined exclusively by the source nations or culturally
affiliated groups.” Id.

RICH NATIONS PROOF (Do Not Delete)

172

PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV.

9/9/2017 12:05 PM

Special Issue

F. Tribes as Entrepreneurs
Fundamental to the economic sovereignty of any self-determining
people is the exclusive ability to capture those economic rents that derive
from business transactions within its territory. The tribes’ power to
capture these economic rents has been recently confirmed by the Supreme
Court’s 1982 decision in Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe. 210
A brief recounting of the facts and holdings of that decision
displays its potential support for the tribe as entrepreneur. The Jicarilla
Apache Tribe imposed a severance tax on “any oil and natural gas severed,
saved and removed from Tribal lands.” 211 Non-Indian mineral lessees
challenged the tribe’s authority to impose such a tax on their leasehold
interests. The Jicarilla tribe resides on a 742,315 acre executive order
reservation in northwest New Mexico. That reservation was established
for the tribe’s exclusive use and occupancy. The tribe leased about 89%
of their reservation for mineral development purposes. Since 1953 various
non-Indian mineral lessees have leased, with federal approval, those tribal
lands.
In exchange for a cash bonus, royalties, and rents, the typical lease
grants the lessee “the exclusive right and privilege to drill for, mine,
extract, remove and dispose of all oil and natural gas deposits in or under”
the leased land for as long as the minerals are produced in paying
quantities. 212
In 1968, the Jicarilla tribe revised its tribal constitution to provide
that “[t]he tribal council may enact ordinances to govern the development
of tribal lands and other resources.” 213 The council later enacted an
ordinance imposing a severance tax on oil and gas production on tribal
land. That ordinance was approved by the BIA in December 1976
The non-Indian mineral lessees argued that their leaseholds
entitled them to enter the reservation and exempted them from further
tribal regulation. Justice Thurgood Marshall, writing for the Court’s
majority, criticized that argument as failing to accord an appropriate
sovereign role to the Jicarilla tribe. Tribal governments, like other
sovereigns, must unequivocally waive their taxing authority within the
governing leases or contracts, and Justice Marshall found nothing in the
challenged tribal mineral leases that demonstrated the Jicarilla tribe’s
intent to waive its sovereign taxing authority. He concluded that the

210.
211.
212.
213.

455 U.S. 130 (1982).
Id. at 136.
Id. at 135.
Id.
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Jicarilla tribe had clearly retained its right to impose a severance tax on the
mineral leaseholds in question. 214
Capturing a share of those economic rents that derive from
reservation-based business activities, according to Justice Thurgood
Marshall, is simply an incident of a tribe’s inherent sovereign authority
recognized by the Court in its 1832 decision in Worcester v. Georgia. 215
Chief Justice John Marshall had reasoned in his opinion in Worcester that
the Cherokee peoples’ right of exclusive use and occupancy of their
reserved lands left no room for Georgia’s exercise of regulatory authority
within their territory. Justice Thurgood Marshall’s opinion in Merrion
likewise sought to create a “growth space” for tribal economic
development by confirming tribal taxing authority over non-Indian
economic activity within Indian Country. Absent the power to exclusively
capture reservation-generated economic rents, tribes that seek to follow
the traditional economic development path are likely doomed to failure. 216
But the Supreme Court’s 1980 decision in Washington v.
Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation 217 has seemingly
214. Id. at 149–52.
215. 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
216. Professor Stephen Cornell considers the tribal exercise of de facto
sovereignty within Indian Country as essential to the economic development of the
Indian peoples:
In virtually every case that we have seen of sustained economic
development on American Indian reservations, the primary
economic decisions are being made by the tribe, not by outsiders.
In every case, the tribe is in the driver’s seat. In every case, the role
of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”) and other outsider agencies
has shifted from decision-maker to resource, from the controlling
influence in decisions to advisor or provider of technical
assistance.
The logic of this is clear. As long as the BIA or some other outside
organization carries primary responsibility for economic
conditions on Indian reservations, development decisions will
reflect the goals of those organizations, not the goals of the tribe.
Furthermore, when outsiders make bad decisions, they don’t pay
the price, the tribe does.
GETCHES ET AL., supra note 10, at 721–22 (citing Stephen Cornell, Sovereignty,
Prospering and Policy in Indian Country Today, 5 COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT 5, 5–
7, 9–13 (1997)).
217. 447 U.S. 134 (1980) (holding valid the enforcement of Washington
taxes as to sales of cigarettes to non-Indian on reservation in state, but imposition on
Indian-owned vehicles held invalid).
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destroyed the tribe’s right to capture a fair share of those economic rents
that derive from economic activity within Indian Country. Instead of
adhering to its Worcester doctrine barring state intrusion into tribal
economic life, Justice White’s opinion developed a preemption-based
analysis that allows a state to tax away virtually all reservation-generated
economic rents unless the affected tribe can demonstrate that those rents
derive from a tribally produced value. 218 He conceded that the Colville
tribe had an interest in generating revenues for essential government
activities; nonetheless he required that the “revenues [be] derived from
value generated on the reservation involving the Tribes . . . [and that] the
taxpayer [be] the recipient of tribal services.” 219
No doubt the Court’s majority was influenced by the fact that the
tribal economic rents at stake derived largely from tribal sales of untaxed
cigarettes to non-Indians who likely traveled to the Colville reservation to
take advantage of those bargain prices.220 But, as recognized by the
dissent, empowering the state and tribe to both tax reservation-based
economic activity not only flies in the face of Worcester, but also renders
problematic the future success of tribal entrepreneurial activity that
involves substantial “cross-border” non-Indian involvement or financial
participation. 221
The dissent’s remarks have proven prophetic. Only one recent
appeals court decision has disallowed state taxation of reservationgenerated value because of its direct impact on tribal economic

218. Id. at 156–57.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 155.
221. The dissent cites three reasons why Indian economic development
will be undermined by this decision:
First, it means that in this case the sharp drop in cigarette sales that
would result from imposition of state tax will reduce revenues not
only of individual Indian retailers, but also of the Tribes themselves
as governmental units. Second, it means that a decision permitting
application of the state tax would place Indian goods at an actual
competitive disadvantage as compared to non-Indian ones because
the former would have to bear two tax burdens while the latter bore
but one. And third, it leads to an actual conflict of jurisdiction and
sovereignty because imposition of the Washington tax would inject
state law into an on-reservation transaction which the Indians have
chosen to subject to their own laws.
Id. at 170 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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development opportunities. 222 In Crow Tribe v. Montana 223 an Indian tribe
challenged Montana’s application of its 30% coal severance tax to nonIndian leaseholders of tribal minerals. In 1972 the tribe leased to
Westmoreland Resources the right to mine tribally-reserved coal under the
so-called ceded strip of tribal land. In 1975 Montana imposed two taxes
on all coal producers. The first was a state severance tax “imposed on each
ton of coal produced in the state.” 224 The rate varied from 3% to 30% of
the coal’s value, depending on the quality and whether the mining was on
the surface or underground. The second tax was a gross proceeds tax
imposed on each person engaged in coal mining. The rate was determined
by applying the relevant county’s property tax to the assessed value of the
coal producer’s gross yield from coal contract sales. The amount taxed
varied by county and year. 225
Between 1975 and 1982, Westmoreland paid $53,800,000 in state
severance taxes and $8,100,000 in state gross proceeds taxes for its ceded
strip mining operations. In 1976 the tribe imposed its own severance tax
of 25% for coal mined on the reservation. In 1982 it enacted a similar tax
for coal mined on the ceded strip. The Department of Interior rejected the
latter tax because the tribal constitution had disclaimed tribal jurisdiction
over the ceded area. That same year Westmoreland agreed to pay the tribal
tax but received credit for the coal taxes paid to Montana. Hence it has
paid no severance tax to the tribe.
Montana relied on the Colville decision as warrant for its taxation
of non-Indian tribal mineral lessees, arguing that the Crow tribe, as in the
earlier case, sought to “market an exemption from state taxation to persons
who would normally do their business elsewhere.” 226 The Ninth Circuit
disagreed, concluding the “coal is the Tribe’s property, a natural resource.
Its lease brings revenue that represents value generated by tribal
activities.” 227
However, it was the appeals court’s analysis of the Crow tribe’s
economic impact study of the state taxes’ effect on the reservation’s coalbased economy that raised troubling analytical issues. That report
concluded that the state taxes prevented Crow coal from competing with
lower-taxed Wyoming coal and resulted in far less Crow coal production
than would otherwise have occurred. The court, over Montana’s vehement
222.
997 (1988).
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

Crow Tribe v. Montana, 819 F.2d 895 (9th Cir. 1987), aff’d, 484 U.S.
819 F.2d at 895.
Id. at 897.
Id.
Id. at 899.
Id.
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objections, concluded that the state taxes had “at least some negative
impact on the coal’s marketability.” 228 Further, even assuming Montana
has a legitimate interest in taxing Crow coal, the court concluded that these
“high taxes affect tribal revenues [and] . . . burden[s] the Tribe’s interests
in coal.” 229 The court also cited the “federal policy of promoting tribal
self-sufficiency and economic development” as the basis for its
preemption holding that Montana’s tax was so large that it could not be
applied to tribal leases without interfering with tribal economic
development. 230
Thus, only when the state proves too greedy in its taxing efforts
or the affected reservation resource is sufficiently disconnected from the
surrounding non-Indian economy 231 will the state’s capture of reservationgenerated economic rents be disallowed. Despite these recent decisions,
some legal commentators insist that engagement by entrepreneurial tribes
with the larger American marketplace will prove the economic salvation
of the Indian peoples. They point to the gaming revenues generated by
American Indian casinos that now total over $8 billion annually as the
product of this successful engagement. 232 They further argue that these
gaming tribes can arguably leverage an additional $8 billion in indirect

228. Id. at 900.
229. Id. at 903.
230. Id. at 898 (quoting White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448
U.S. 136, 140, 149 (1980)).
231. A unanimous Court emphasized the isolation of this reservationbased hunting and fishing resource marketed to non-Indian customers as leaving no
place for state regulation:
The State has failed to “identify any regulatory function or service
. . . that would justify” the assertion of concurrent regulatory
authority. The hunting and fishing permitted by the Tribe occur
entirely on the reservation. The fish and wildlife resources are
either native to the reservation or were created by the joint efforts
of the Tribe and the Federal Government. New Mexico does not
contribute in any significant respect to the maintenance of these
resources, and can point to no other “governmental functions it
provides” . . . in connection with hunting and fishing on the
reservation by non-members that would justify the assertion of its
authority.
New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 341–42 (1983).
232. Kenneth E. Robbins, Casino Buying Power: Catalyst for Economic
Development, 16 AM. INDIAN REP. 20 (2000).
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economic benefits to Indian Country by preferentially contracting with
and employing Indian contractors and workers. 233
But neither the gaming, nor the entrepreneurial tribe will likely
lead the way to the promised land of tribal economic self-determination.
The 1988 enactment of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (“IGRA”)
authorizes states to effectively dictate the terms of gaming compacts to the
affected tribes and to undermine the utility of gaming for tribal economic
development. 234 Some gaming tribes, it is true, have become fabulously
wealthy. 235 But their critics contend that their success cannot be
realistically duplicated elsewhere in Indian Country. Relatively few tribes
enjoy those favorable locations near wealthy population centers that are
key to the development of lucrative tribal casinos and bingo palaces. 236
Furthermore, Congress’ enactment of IGRA, as demonstrated by lower
court interpretations of that Act, has effectively nullified the tribes’ hardwon legal triumph in California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians. 237
Congress effectively extended state regulatory control over the
nature, scope and size of that most lucrative form of Indian gaming, now
known as Class III gaming. Few states, in this brave new world of
cutthroat competition for the gaming dollar, are likely to agree to largescale, casino-style tribal gaming within their borders unless the tribes are
willing to share a substantial portion of their gaming revenues with them.
Furthermore, many of the more conservative and traditional tribes likewise
question whether gaming is good for their own tribal members who may
gamble away their hard-earned money that they should use to support their
families. 238
But even deeper legal and ethical difficulties are presented by the
rise of the entrepreneurial tribe. First, such entrepreneurship presupposes
a tribal class who, functioning as tribal developers, views their Indian
peoples as “embodied” capital. Thus, the “tragedy of development” plays
out within Indian Country as tribal members are graded into hierarchical

233. Id.
234. Judge William C. Canby, joined by three other Ninth Circuit judges,
dissented from the circuit’s denial of a rehearing en banc of the Rumsey decision. See
Rumsey Indian Rancheria of Wintun Indians v. Wilson, 64 F.3d 1250, 1253 (9th Cir.
1995), cert. denied, Sycuan Band of Mission Indians v. Wilson, 521 U.S. 1118 (1997)
(“But under Rumsey . . . [t]he State thus has no incentive to negotiate, and there is no
system [due to the Seminole decision] to require negotiation. IGRA is rendered
toothless.”).
235. GETCHES ET AL., supra note 10, at 739–54.
236. Id.
237. 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
238. GETCHES ET AL., supra note 10, at 739–54.
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rankings that run unidimensionally from the worst to best workers.239
Second, unless the entrepreneurial tribe convinces the federal court that its
revenues derive from its exploitation of a tribally-generated reservation
value, the surrounding state may tax away much of the economic rents
derived from that economic activity. 240 Third, state sovereign immunity
likely bars the entrepreneurial tribe from suing the state for the redress of
any injury from the state’s exercise of governmental power within Indian
Country. 241 These factors combine to substantially limit the economic
design within which the entrepreneurial tribe can operate in service of
tribal self-determination.
G. Summary of Tribal Achievement Via the Standard Development
Model
The sum total result of the Indian peoples’ efforts to realize selfdetermination via the standard development model of Indian Country has
been to fritter away their passions and energies in a fruitless effort to
escape their assigned tribal status. In bumping up, again and again, against
the brick ceiling of their legally-assigned status, the Indian peoples have
demonstrated their tenacity and desire to survive. My suggestion in the
next section is that they turn their passions and energies to the very
different task of internally reconstructing the tribe to meet the real human
needs of their members.

239. Marshall Berman synthesizes Joseph Schumpeter’s and Karl Marx’s
“creative destruction” concept in describing the disruptive impact of economic
development on the social bonds and cultural ties of traditionally underdeveloped
societies, such as those of the Indian peoples. He quotes Marx as follows:
All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and
venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed
ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid
melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, and men at last are forced
to face . . . the real conditions of their lives and their relations with
their fellow men.
MARSHALL BERMAN, ALL THAT IS SOLID MELTS INTO AIR 21 (1982).
240. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian
Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
241. The Supreme Court has held that a state’s Eleventh Amendment
immunity to suit precludes tribes from suing the state. Blatchford v. Native Village
of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775 (1991).
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III. TRIBES AS RICH NATIONS: SKETCHING AN ALTERNATIVE
MODEL OF TRIBAL SELF-DETERMINATION
A. Why the Standard Model of Tribal Self-Determination Has Failed
Indian Country
Two rival interpretive processes must be reconciled if the Indian
peoples are to realize meaningful tribal self-determination. The first
process constituted the “tribe” as the historical product of non-Indian
interaction with the indigenous people of North America. The
constructive processes of non-Indian history—war, disease, trade, treaties,
common law, and European political and socio-cultural theory—created
the tribe as a means to serve non-Indian ends. 242 The second process
focuses on the ordinary experiences of Indian people as the contemporary
source for reconstructing the tribe. 243 The following discussion traces the
failure of the former interpretive idea as a means for tribal selfdetermination; the latter interpretive idea is addressed in the next section.

242. Professor Stephen Cornell argues that the “tribe” was created by
those European and American negotiators “who searched for and often assumed
comprehensive structures of authority or hierarchical political organization” among
the Indian people. CORNELL, supra note 2, at 78. Indeed, Cornell concludes that
“[c]omprehensive political organization at times was even made a prerequisite for
[federal] negotiations” with the Indian peoples. Id. at 79.
243. Professor Cornell believes that there is evidence of the Indian
peoples’ self-renewal:
The political resurgence of the last few decades has been a cultural
resurgence as well. Tribal languages are being taught in some
reservation schools. Many young people are showing a new
interest in their heritage. Indian writers and painters have
immersed themselves in the traditions of their peoples,
rearticulating them in new ways. The symbols of Indianness, from
bumper-sticker slogans to religious fetishes, are becoming more
visible, not less. Much of this trend reflects an attempt by some
individuals to locate their own roots, to touch base with some
identity more substantial than the dominant culture seems able to
provide, an attempt to put a thicker flesh on the bones of their selfconcept. The question is whether this cultural resurgence will be
realized in actual patterns of life and action or will remain simply
a veneer, an overlay on lives shaped to a large degree by the nonIndian world, a collection of icons that symbolize an identity and a
past but organize little of contemporary life.
Id. at 212.

RICH NATIONS PROOF (Do Not Delete)

180

PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV.

9/9/2017 12:05 PM

Special Issue

The first interpretive process hierarchically notched the tribe into
American law and governance as “domestic dependent nations.” 244 It
provided the structure for the channeling of American values into Indian
Country. 245 Its goal was to progressively remake the Indian peoples in the
American image. Its failure to realize this goal by the 1880s counseled its
abandonment in favor of the Indian allotment policy. 246 Ironically, the
“tribe” was revived in the 1930s by Indian Commissioner John Collier,
and later strengthened in the 1970s and 1980s by Presidents Nixon and
Reagan, as the express vehicle for indigenous self-determination. 247
Despite this organizational refashioning of the tribe, it remains the means
whereby American technology, financial interests, and commercial and
social ideas are channeled into Indian Country. 248
Why this tribal self-determination strategy has failed Indian
Country is evident from the practical counsel it offered to the would-be
self-determining tribe. In paraphrase it tells the tribe that:

244. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
245. Cornell contends that the Europeans and Americans consciously
sought to transform the Indian peoples into tribes in order to “reproduce the processes
of interstate politics by which their own external relations were governed.” CORNELL,
supra note 2, at 77.
246. Cornell describes this process of “de-tribalization” via the Indian
allotment legislation in these terms:
Allotment . . . specified a new set of incorporative relationships . .
. . Indians were able to retain significant control over land and
related resources, but only via allotment. [E]very Indian taking up
allotment . . . [became] a citizen of the United States . . . [and the]
act envisioned both the individualization of tribal property and the
dissolution of tribal polity. Indians were to be incorporated as
individuals into both the economic and political structures of the
larger society. It was the ultimate form of control: the end of the
tribe itself as a political and social entity.
Id. at 59.
247. Indian Commissioner John Collier recognized in the 1930s,
according to Professor Cornell, “the collapse of indigenous [Indian] political
[[institutions].” Id. at 95. Collier’s solution was to “insert individual Indians into the
institutional structures of the larger society, and those structures would be built into
Indian communities themselves.” Id. at 94.
248. Collier’s hope was that “[a]s Indian tribes voluntarily formed
constitutional governments, undertook the development of their own resources, and
joined with the federal government in the assault on poverty and ignorance,
assimilation would necessarily follow.” Id. at 95.
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You must consciously remake yourself in a strategically
minded, adaptively useful and symbolically powerful way
to become successfully self-determining. 249 Strategically,
you must identify and mobilize those resources on your
reservation that can serve as tools for selfdetermination. 250 Adaptively, you must retool your
inherited traditions and cultural beliefs as means to
successfully interact with the surrounding non-Indian
economies and governments. 251 Symbolically, you must
recast your government and legal institutions so as to
reasonably overlap with the American society’s ruling
notions of due process and equal protection. 252 In brief,
you must become non-Indian governments and societies
if you are to realize self-determination. 253
The only problem with this strategy is that it does not work! The
Eastern Cherokees, beginning after their early interaction with American
colonists, sought to follow this counsel by developing a written tribal
alphabet, constitution, courts, schools, as well as law and order codes,
249. Id.
250. Such counsel invites tribes to look beyond “relying exclusively on
federal funding and gaming to build tribal coffers . . . [and use] tax exempt bonds as a
means of ensuring their economic independence and tribal sovereignty.” Melissa L.
Gedachian, Safeguarding Sovereignty with Tax Free Bonds, 13 INDIAN REP. 18
(1997). This article goes on to say that “experts agree that training tribal members in
finance is crucial for the future of tribal sovereignty.” Id. at 20.
251. Dale Rood, a Turtle Clan representative to the Oneida Nation and
part-time special projects technician in the Nation’s management information services
department, aspires to use the Internet as a means of extending tribal sovereignty and
cultural renewal:
We’re using the Internet to preserve our language and culture, but
also to enhance our lifestyle. We think it’s important to maintain
that website because we see it as an opportunity to tell our own
story. Many times our website is the first impression people will
have of the Oneidas.
Marguerite D. Carroll, Indians on the Internet: Link to a Legacy, Path to the Future,
13 INDIAN REP. 12, 13 (1997).
252. The integration of tribes into American society has been ongoing
since the 1930s and contemplates, according to Stephen Cornell, “the reproduction of
dominant-group institutions and values—in particular, elected representative
government, market-oriented economic organization, corporate business structures—
within Indian communities.” CORNELL, supra note 2, at 152.
253. Id.
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modeled on those extant in the surrounding American society. But their
adaptive efforts did not save them, or the other civilized eastern Indian
tribes, from summary congressional removal in the 1830s west of the
Mississippi River. 254 Likewise, the Suquamish Tribe’s adoption in the
1970s of a tribal criminal code guaranteeing fundamental due process to
all criminal defendants did not sustain its assertion of inherent criminal
jurisdiction over two, admittedly, very “bad” non-Indian men on its
reservation. 255 It just did not matter, according to Justice Rehnquist’s
opinion, how successfully adapted the Suquamish people had become, the
Indian tribe had, early on, been divested by Marshall’s Indian law
opinions, of its inherent criminal jurisdiction over non-Indian
defendants. 256
Viewing the tribe as an adaptive unit has likewise failed as a
means of economic development within Indian Country. Frustrated by the
lack of observable economic growth within Indian Country, contemporary
development experts have sought to identify those “break-away” tribes
who can serve as emulative models for tribes who are arguably adrift in a
sea of self-determination opportunities. 257 Listless and becalmed tribes,
too, can hum with entrepreneurial energy if only they would
governmentally, technologically and commercially restructure themselves
so as to take advantage of these opportunities. 258
Indian law experts have also resorted to this first interpretive
process to diagnose and explain the root cause of the contemporary failure
of tribal self-determination. The prescriptions they offer as solutions focus
on what the federal government should do to restore self-determining
status to the tribe. First, the federal government should insulate the tribe
from state intrusion upon its essential governmental, economic and
regulatory activities. 259 Second, the federal government should provide
sufficient economic infrastructure to the tribe so that it can pursue a
reasonable economic and social recovery strategy. 260 Third, the federal
government should restore its historic tradition of bilateral and transparent
negotiation with the tribe as the basis for a new government-to254. GETCHES ET AL., supra note 10, at 93–128.
255. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 210–11 (1978).
256. Id.
257. Stephen Cornell, Sovereignty, Prosperity and Policy in Indian
Country Today, 5 COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT 5, 5–13 (1997).
258. Id.
259. Gloria Valencia-Weber, Shrinking Indian Country: A State Offensive
to Divest Tribal Sovereignty, 27 CONN. L. REV. 1281 (1995).
260. Raymond Cross, Sovereign Bargains, Indian Takings, and the
Preservation of Indian Country in the Twenty-first Century, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 425
(1998) [hereinafter Cross, Sovereign Bargains].
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government relationship. 261 Fourth, the federal government should
embody in a new “sovereign trust duty” those security guarantees that are
essential to tribal self-determination. 262 Doubtless, the route to tribal selfdetermination would be smoothed if these prescriptions were adopted by
the federal government. But, as both a practical and conceptual matter,
federal acceptance of these prescriptions would amount to the overthrow
of this governing interpretive process.
These advocates on behalf of the Indian peoples are undoubtedly
sincere in their desire to address the many and real problems that exist
within today’s Indian reservations. They hope to better the Indian peoples’
material conditions—upgrade their health status, increase their per capita
income, increase their children’s educational attainment levels, and
generate more reservation-based employment opportunities. But the
Indian peoples are aware, as are many non-Indian peoples, that it is not the
deprivation of material options that has produced today’s dispirited
generation of children, both on-reservation and off-reservation. Lost
Indian children, like some non-Indian children, seek their identity through
peer-governed rituals of gang membership, Indian-on-Indian violence,
substance abuse, flirtations with suicide, and other forms of antisocial
behavior. These phenomena evidence a deeper crisis within contemporary
Indian societies than cannot be encompassed within a handbook on tribal
economic development. 263
Socio-biologists tell us that the creation of such “wolf-children”
within Indian Country is the expected product of systemically ill
communities—communities unable to come to grips with the pathologies
such as fetal alcohol syndrome, child abuse, alcoholism, chronic
unemployment and domestic violence. 264
Authentic tribal self261. Charles Wilkinson, The Role of Bilateralism in Fulfilling the
Federal-Tribal Relationship: The Tribal Rights-Endangered Species Secretarial
Order, 72 WASH. L. REV. 1063, 1065 (1997).
262. Mary Christina Wood, Protecting the Attributes of Native
Sovereignty: A New Trust Paradigm for Federal Actions Affecting Tribal Lands and
Resources, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 109.
263. The success of Indian gaming enterprises on some reservations has
brought new addictions and new dangers to the Indian communities. It is not
“uncommon at many gaming facilities to see children roaming the halls, playing video
games or swimming at the pool—often unsupervised—while their parents are
gambling.” See Marguerite D. Carroll, Who’s Minding the Kids?, 14 INDIAN REP. 18
(1998). The most obvious community costs involve Indian “families going there
anyway and casinos are forced to deal with things like children being left in cars for
hours.” Id. at 19.
264. Sociologist James L. Coleman explains such systemically ill
communities as ones where “the social system comes to consist of individualistic
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determination will require the Indian peoples to acknowledge and directly
confront this painful reality. Current federal Indian policy exteriorizes
responsibility for “doing something” about this reality to the BIA or IHS,
as well as other federal agencies. So far, none of the federally-sponsored
programs or grants have done much to address the underlying generative
processes that produce these societal pathologies within Indian Country. 265
Only by reinternalizing these problems within the Indian communities
themselves will lasting and sustainable solutions to these difficulties be
crafted and successfully implemented. 266
B. Structuring the Transcendent Model of Tribal Self-Determination
Folding the tribe into non-Indian history has locked the Indian
peoples into an unyielding interpretive process that, as told by my fouryear-old daughter’s pre-school song, is “too deep to go under it, too wide
to go around it, too high to go over it, so I guess we will have to go through
it.” 267 That is exactly what the Indian peoples will have to do. But “going
through” this veil of non-Indian history will require the Indian peoples to
expend much social and emotional energy. By interpolating the tribe into
solutions to individual problems; with all suffering at the hands of each as each carries
out his acts unconstrained by their consequences for others.” JAMES S. COLEMAN,
NORMS AS SOCIAL CAPITAL, IN ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM: ECONOMICS APPLIED
OUTSIDE THE FIELD OF ECONOMICS 153 (Gerard Radnitsky & Peter Bernholz eds.,
1987).
1997 BIA statistics estimate that 375 gangs with about 4,650 members
operate in or near Indian Country. Tribes such as the Three Affiliated Tribes of the
Fort Berthold Reservation in North Dakota are only now trying to get a handle on this
issue. The principal of New Town High School, Spencer Wilkinson, says that “[w]e
have a lot of these problems—drug abuse, alcohol abuse—that big cities have, but
we're out here in the boondocks.” See Melissa Goldblatt, Getting A Grip On Gangs,
14 INDIAN REP. 26 (1998).
This tribe has taken the first step among tribes to seek to coordinate their
ordinances with those of the BIA, city and county authorities in an effort to address
gang-related violence. Id.
265. The Justice Department’s recent study regarding violent crime among
America’s different races confirms this difficult reality. While violent crime rates
have dropped significantly among other racial groups, the incidence of violent crime
among American Indians remains disturbingly high. Indians are twice as likely to be
victims of violent crimes than blacks, whites or Asians. Indian women were victimized
by their partners twice as often as black women. The study by the Bureau of Justice
Statistics looked at statistics for rape, sexual assault, robbery, aggrevated assault, and
simple assault for the period 1993 through 1998. See Missoulian Newspaper, Mar.
19, 2001, at A5.
266. Id.
267. Lyrics available upon request.
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non-Indian history, federal policy makers sought to co-opt the Indian
peoples’ underlying cultures and traditions into America’s melting pot.
Only by creating disjunctures between this interpolated history through
tactics of cultural and social resistance have the Indian peoples survived. 268
This strategy is illustrated by the young Black Elk’s vision:
And as I looked and wept, I saw that there stood on the
north side of the Starving camp a Sacred man who was
painted red all over his body, and he held a spear as he
walked into the center of his people, and there he laid
down and rolled. And when he got up it was a fat bison
standing there, and where the bison stood a Sacred herb
sprang up right where the tree had been in the center of
the nation’s hoop. The herb grew and bore four blossoms
on a single stem while I was looking—a blue, a white, a

268. The Indian people became “props” setting the stage for the American
epic about the conquest of the West. Professor Nathan Glazer argues Winning of the
West, written on an epic scale by Teddy Roosevelt, created the national text of
“unabashed nationalism” for the displacement and dispossession of the Indian people.
The Indians in Roosevelt’s text are unredeemably cruel and treacherous. He
characterizes the Indians thus:
Not only were they very terrible in battle, but they were cruel
beyond all belief in victory . . . . The hideous, unnameable,
unthinkable tortures [practiced] by the red men on their captured
[foes’] tender women and helpless children, were such as we read
of in no other struggle, hardly even the revolting pages that tell the
deeds of the Holy Inquisition.
Glazer, supra note 42, at 12.
Given the unredeemable Indian character, Roosevelt feels no need for a
retrospective national apology for their destruction by federal military forces:
Looking back, it is easy to say that much of the wrong-doing could
have been prevented; but if we examine the facts to find out the
truth, not to establish a theory, we are bound to admit that the
struggle could not possibly have been avoided. . . . Unless we were
willing that the whole continent west of the Alleghenies should
remain as unpeopled waste, the hunting ground of savages, war
was inevitable.
Id. at 12–13.
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scarlet and a yellow—and the bright rays of these flashed
to the heavens. 269
Cultural survival requires much psychic and social energy and has
not been accomplished without significant damage to the Indian peoples.
Psychologists have diagnosed a syndrome they have named “intergenerational post-traumatic stress disorder” to describe the long term
effect of two hundred years of federal policy on the Indian peoples. 270
Some have characterized it as a “spiritual injury” in these terms:
It is apparent that the psyche of the community recognized
the wounding of the community, and that this awareness
in turn was perceived as a wounding of the psyche.
Harmony had become discord and the community’s
unconscious perception was that the world was unfriendly
and hostile. The problems that were manifested and
verbalized were merely symptoms of a deeper wound—
the soul wound. 271
Just as new therapeutic approaches have been developed that
address the inter-generational transmission of Indian parental traumatic
experiences and responses to their children, so too must a new theory of
the tribe seek to support the Indian peoples’ growing societal and cultural
revitalization efforts. 272 Only by reconnecting the revitalizing sphere of
Indian socio-cultural life to the tribal governmental sphere of legitimate
authority will tribal life-worlds be restored.
C. Linking Tribal Self-Determination to the Restoration of Tribal
Life-Worlds
Behind the positivistic legal formulation of the tribe—defined by
federal Indian common law, treaties and statutes—exists the real world of
the Indian peoples’ experiences. This world has rarely interested those
federal policy makers who fashioned decisional rules for resolving
practical conflicts between Indians and non-Indians over land, trade,

269. BONNIE DURAN ET AL., NATIVE AMERICANS
HISTORY 70 (Russell Thompson ed., 1998).
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id.
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water, economic activities, natural resources, and crime. 273 Indeed, it was
their studied lack of interest in the almost overwhelming diversity of
Indian life-worlds that enabled the cultural survival of the contemporary
Indian peoples. Restoring tribal life-worlds requires a new tribe, one that
reconnects the Indian peoples with a newly-legitimized tribal sphere of
governance. As A. K. Sen persuasively argues in his new book,
Development as Freedom, only by relinking democratic governance to a
society’s defining value orientations will the derived and surface political
expressions legitimate governmental action. 274 Only by re-embedding the
tribe, long detached from the underlying tribal society by the IRA and
similar positivistic legal initiatives, will tribal governmental action accord
with the real interest of the Indian peoples. 275
Sen structures societal governance as the primary means of
realizing human freedom. He offers three principles for the development
of this type of democratic governance. First, full development of human
capabilities demands that any society accord to all its members the
opportunity for meaningful social and political participation. 276 Second,
individuals and groups within that society must be encouraged to
conceptualize their needs and demands in a socially comprehensible
manner that can be politically expressed through their governing
institutions. 277 Third, the governing institutions must demonstrate that
273. This lack of interest in the contemporary Indian world is quite
understandable from the non-Indian standpoint. Teddy Roosevelt in his multi-volume
epic, Winning the West, viewed the Indian world as “finished” and sought to give
“moral closure” to that outcome. The Indian world had ended and the white world
was beginning in America according to Roosevelt’s historical narrative of the West.
Thus, Roosevelt’s lack of interest in the Indian peoples is part of a larger fashioning
of a new American narrative described by Professor White:
The historical narrative . . . reveals to us a world that is putatively
“finished,” done with . . . . Insofar, as historical stories can be
completed, can be given narrative closure, can be shown to have
had a plot all along, they give to reality the odor of the ideal . . . .
The demand for closure in the historical story is a demand, I
suggest, for moral meaning, a demand that sequences of real events
be assessed as to their significance as elements of a moral drama.
DENNIS K. MUMBY, COMMUNICATION AND POWER IN ORGANIZATIONS: DISCOURSE,
IDEOLOGY AND DOMINATION 110 (1988) (quoting H. WHITE, TOPICS OF DISCOURSE:
ESSAYS IN CULTURAL CRITICISM 24 (1980)).
274. AMARTYA KOMAR SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 145–59 (1999).
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id.
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they “hear” these demands and respond to these needs through
governmental action that demonstrates societal accountability. 278
By giving both a “thin” and “thick” account of how the application
of Sen’s model may contribute to the restoration of tribal life-worlds, I
hope to reconcile these two rival processes. At the thin level, I propose
several background principles that are necessary, but not sufficient, for
reconnecting the new tribe and the underlying tribal societies. At the thick
level, I tell a story about how real tribal people—the Mandan, Hidatsa and
Arikara peoples of the Fort Berthold Reservation—may apply these
principles to recover, socially and economically, from the devastating
effects of the 1949 federal taking that virtually destroyed their reservation.
My goal in telling this story is to reweave orienting tribal beliefs and
values of these Indian peoples into a coherent pattern of socially
comprehensible governmental action. By combining these thin and thick
accounts of tribal restoration, I hope to reconcile these two rival
interpretive views within the body of a new, unifying entity—the “new
tribe.”
D. Taking the First Steps Toward the New Tribe
Only the “new tribe” can restore the communicative power of the
Indian peoples and thereby give content to the now empty concept of tribal
self-determination. The Supreme Court in its 1978 decision in Santa
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez 279 recognized that only the Indian peoples can
speak to those basic constitutional issues, such as the eligibility criteria for
tribal membership, that define a distinct peoples. The Court’s refusal to
hear a female tribal member’s challenge to the Pueblo’s ordinance that
denied tribal membership to the children of those tribal women who
choose to marry outside of the tribe accorded “proper respect for tribal
sovereignty” according to the majority. 280
The Martinez decision permits the fundamental reworking of a
tribe’s relationship to its constituent societal elements, whether traditional
or modern, without undue interference from the federal government. That
decision wisely leaves it up to the respective Indian peoples to determine
when, if ever, they will fully adapt their institutions to accord with
prevailing non-Indian notions of wise societal governance. The
contemporary Indian peoples are left to take the next step on their own to
realize the restoration of tribal life-worlds.

278.
279.
280.

Id.
436 U.S. 49 (1978).
Id. at 60.
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1. The “Thin” Theory of the New Tribe
For those Indian peoples who choose to take the next step, I offer
the following “thin” and “thick” observations to guide them in this
endeavor. At the thin level, I offer two background principles that are
necessary for creating the new tribe. First, these Indian peoples must be
reasonably immune to what Professor Mary Midgley calls the “menace of
fatalism.” Many non-Indian people, as well as some Indian people, are
deeply skeptical of the ability of today’s Indian peoples to realize tribal
self-determination. That skepticism is sometimes expressed in terms of
the Indian peoples’ innate genetic, biological or cultural characteristics
that will doom any real chance for tribal self-determination. 281 While the
Indian peoples must realistically assess those dangers and risks that hedge
their opportunities for self-determination, they must not allow such fears
to paralyze tribal action by giving undue weight to a non-Indian view of
history that has long since written the Indian peoples’ epitaph. 282
Second, the Indian peoples must adopt the principle of
“enoughness” as expressing their confidence that they can use their
existing material and social resources effectively to re-define and meet
their pressing human development needs. This is a realistic presumption
given that most Indian peoples have the available resources to meet the
material subsistence needs of their members. Such a base is the reasonable

281. Teddy Roosevelt saw the demise of the Indian peoples as inevitable
given that “[d]uring the past three centuries, the spread of the English-speaking
peoples across the world’s waste spaces has been not only the most striking feature in
the world’s history, but also the event of all others most far-reaching in its effects and
importance.” Glazer, supra note 42, at 12.
282. Professor Clark Wissler asks “Did the Indians Live in Vain?”:
When we look back over the spectacle of Indian annihilation, the
ruthless advance of the frontier crushing out the lives of Indians on
every hand, though sacrificing a lot of white blood to achieve this
end, we moved to ask: Did the Indian live in vain? Was all that he
did, struggled for, fought for ten thousand years to be obliterated
in three centuries? Was it misplaced charity on the part of the
victors to put their helpless victims on reservations, to be wasted
by disease, hunger and poverty, and later do everything possible to
keep them alive merely to live as minorities? . . . There are no
satisfactory answers.
CLARK WISSLER, INDIANS OF THE UNITED STATES 326 (1940).

RICH NATIONS PROOF (Do Not Delete)

190

PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV.

9/9/2017 12:05 PM

Special Issue

starting point for the Indian peoples to begin the creation of the new
tribe. 283
2. The “Thick” Theory of the New Tribe: A Case Study of the Mandan,
Hidatsa and Arikara Peoples’ Struggle for Social and Economic
Recovery from the 1949 Garrison Taking
The removal of the Mandan, Hidatsa and Arikara peoples in 1953
from the Fort Berthold Reservation to make way for the Garrison Dam
was perhaps the most traumatic event they faced since the 1837 smallpox
epidemic devastated their population, virtually wiping out the Mandan
people. Although the trauma imposed on these peoples played its way out
in many destructive private and public displays—such as greatly increased
welfare dependency, domestic violence and alcoholism—I focus on its
catalytic effect in spurring subsequent tribal action directed to social and
economic recovery of these Indian peoples from the debilitating effects of
the Garrison taking. 284
Historian Roy W. Meyer correctly assigns the bulk of the blame
for the Garrison Dam to “Congress and . . . those segments of the public
who brought pressure on their elected representatives to have it built.” 285
But it is the tribal people and their leaders who ultimately bear the
283. The starting point for authentic self-determination may well be the
Indian peoples’ recognition of this principle:
The shift to postmaterialist values calls into question the
distribution of power: deep shifts in existing structures are needed
to make and execute the kind of choices that will lead to
sustainability.
Therefore sustainability is inseparable from
personal and collective empowerment. A revitalized democratic
spirit, expressed in a myriad of forms, indicates the viability of a
participatory political culture . . . . Individuals in an expansive
democratic system do not so much discover the common good as
create it, by interacting with each other and constructing share
purposes . . . self-governance in the public sphere helps transform
conflicting interests into common ones while at the same time
promoting individual autonomy and freedom. Personal
transformation and social transformation are thus reciprocally
related.
STEPHEN WOOLPERT, THE PRACTICE OF TRANSFORMATIONAL POLITICS: AN OVERVIEW
172–73 (Stephen Woolpert et al. eds., 1998).
284. See Cross, Sovereign Bargains, supra note 260, at 477–509.
285. ROY W. MEYER, THE VILLAGE INDIANS OF THE UPPER MISSOURI: THE
MANDAN, HIDATSA AND ARIKARA 233 (1977).
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responsibility to frame an adequate response so as to ensure their eventual
recovery from this man-made disaster. I evaluate two distinct tribal
responses to this disaster and evaluate their potential for facilitating tribal
collective action directed to the social and economic recovery of these
peoples from the 1949 Garrison taking.
a. Response 1: The Tribal Decision to Spend the Entire $7.5 Million in
Compensation for the 1949 Garrison Taking as Per Capita Payments to
Individual Tribal Members
Political in-fighting between two powerful tribal leaders—Martin
Cross and Carl Whitman, Jr.—focused on how to spend the $7.5 million
payable to the tribal peoples as just compensation for their economic losses
stemming from the Garrison taking. Cross favored the per capita
distribution of virtually all of the monies to individual tribal members,
while Whitman favored the retention of most of these monies in tribal
programs to address the long-term recovery needs of the people. 286
This issue dominated tribal politics from the 1950 tribal council
election until 1957 when the final distribution plan for these monies was
approved by Congress. Cross used his pro per capita platform in the 1950
election to defeat Whitman. The BIA, in the throes of the termination era,
sought to exploit this issue as grounds for proposing the termination of the
tribe. Indian Commissioner Myer concluded that if the tribal government
was competent to spend millions of dollars, then it no longer needed the
supervision of the BIA. 287 Cross and the tribal council responded to
Myer’s proposed termination of their tribe in an artful manner: “[W]e are
not opposed to the withdrawal by the government of any help that they
give us . . . . We only oppose their interference with our management of
our own property and money.” 288 This artful dodge by the tribal council
worked to prevent the BIA’s proposed termination of the Mandan, Hidatsa
and Arikara peoples.
While Cross and Whitman battled over money and tribal power,
the coming reality of the destruction of the Fort Berthold Reservation was
graphically depicted on the cover of the Fort Berthold Agency News
Bulletin. Lake Sakakawea, the reservoir to be created by the Garrison
Dam, was portrayed as a sea serpent spreading its tentacles over a radically
segmented and divided Fort Berthold Reservation. 289

286.
287.
288.
289.

Id. at 230.
Id. at 231.
Id.
Id. at 233.
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The BIA—given the traumatized daze of the tribal people—
struggled to formulate governmental, economic and social responses to
this new reality. One BIA inspired remedy—relocation—would move
young Indian men and women from the reservation to urban areas such as
Denver, Oakland and Chicago. The hope was that their chances for
employment, after the completion of a trade or craft apprenticeship, would
materially improve their life chances. Many young people from Fort
Berthold went through the “relocation” process in the 1950s and 1960s,
but few, if any, experienced any permanent improvement in their material
circumstances. 290
The new agency superintendent, Ben Reifel, strongly supported
the relocation program stating that “[a] reservation is fast becoming just a
place where some Indians were born. The United States is the Indian
citizen’s ‘reservation’ today.” 291 A later superintendent, Ralph Shane,
similarly asserted that the Indians would one day thank the United States
because their removal is “by no means the end of the trail for any people,
any culture, any way of life, nor an ascending economy.” 292 He believed
that the Indians’ removal, just like their evacuation from Like-A-Fishhook
Village in the 1880s would lead to their ultimate renewal if they could rise
to meet the challenge. 293
The BIA’s vision was to recreate Fort Berthold as new, dispersed
tribal communities on the residual high-plains of the reservation. These
new communities—Mandaree, Twin Buttes and New Town—sought to
fuse the three tribal groups into one new tribal identity. Indeed, the name
“Mandaree” is a composite of the syllables Mandans, Hidatsa and
Arikaree.294 But the reality of physical separation on the desolate high
plains imposed severe limits on the governmental and economic reintegration of the Fort Berthold Reservation. The deteriorating social
welfare status of the Indians is reflected in the substantial decline of their
income from farming and grazing leases. While 39% of their income came
from that source in the pre-dam era, only 10% of their income derived
from that source after the Garrison Dam. Welfare, which had been a
negligible source of income for the Indians prior to the dam, increased
nine-fold after the Garrison Dam. 295
The most telling effect of the Garrison Dam has been the
absorption of the Indian peoples into the surrounding non-Indian
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.

Id. at 226.
MEYER, supra note 285, at 226.
Id. at 228.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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institutions and economy. Their distinctive Indian schools disappeared
and most Indian children either attended public school or made the long
trek off-reservation to the BIA boarding schools. 296 Young Indian men
and women began to see themselves as primarily wage-laborers, hiring out
as help on non-Indian run ranches and farms or relocating off-reservation.
This fact is reflected in the increase in reservation wage income from 14%
in the pre-dam era to 43% in the post-dam era. 297 While the scope of
psychological damage cannot be fully summarized in statistics, the
Mandan, Hidatsa and Arikara peoples clearly had to face substantial
adjustment challenges in adapting to their new reservation setting. 298
b. Response 2: The Mandan, Hidatsa and Arikara Peoples’ Long
Struggle to Recover Just Compensation for the 1949 Garrison Taking
In 1984 the Mandan, Hidatsa and Arikara peoples had the
opportunity to renew their claim for just compensation for the 1949
Garrison taking. The Garrison Diversion Unit Commission (“GDUC”),
an eleven-member congressionally appointed body, concluded that these
Indians had borne a disproportionate share of the economic burden in
having the Garrison Dam and reservoir located on their tribal
homelands. 299 It based this finding on its review of the legislative record
of the 1949 Takings Act. The GDUC was convinced by this review that
the Indians had suffered devastating economic, cultural and social losses
due to the federal government’s taking of their most productive
agricultural lands. It also found that Congress may have failed to make
the Indian peoples whole for their economic losses arising from the 1949
taking. 300 It therefore directed the Indians’ trustee—the Interior
Secretary—to hold administrative hearings on the Indians’ just
compensation and related claims. 301

296. MEYER, supra note 285, at 228.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. This was the finding of the Garrison Diversion Unit Commission
(“GDUC”), an eleven-member congressional commission that was created in 1984 to
assess the impacts of the Garrison Project on the peoples of North Dakota. See
Recommendations of the Garrison Diversion Unit Commission on H.R. 1116, A Bill
to Implement Certain Recommendations Made Pursuant to Pub. L. 98-360: Hearings
on H.R. 1116 Before the Subcommittee on Water and Power Resources, 99th Cong.
114 (1985).
300. Id. at 114.
301. It recommended that the Interior Secretary establish a five-member
commission to assess and report on the steps necessary to “complete the
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Interior Secretary Donald P. Hodel was directed by the GDUC to
establish a secretarial commission that would examine the Indians’ just
compensation and related claims. He was also directed to recommend
appropriate implementing legislation if his commission concluded that the
federal government had failed to justly compensate these Indians for their
losses arising from the taking. Secretary Hodel established the Joint Tribal
Advisory Committee (“JTAC”) by secretarial charter in 1985 to hear and
evaluate the Indians’ claims arising from the 1985 taking of their
reservation. 302
c. The Mandan, Hidatsa and Arikara Indians Just Compensation Case
Before the JTAC
The hearings before the JTAC provided the organizational catalyst
for these tribal peoples to join together and present personal testimony and
other evidence regarding the devastating effects of the 1949 taking on their
culture and economy. The JTAC construed its charter so as to allow the
Indian people to present relevant expert and lay testimony regarding their

indemnification of the Indian communities of North Dakota that were disrupted by
construction of Pick-Sloan Missouri Basin Program dams and reservoirs.” Id. at 74.
The GDUC recommended that the Interior Secretary appoint the commission
no later than January 31, 1984, to address the following issues on the Fort Berthold
Indian Reservation:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
j.

Full potential for irrigation.
Financial assistance for on-farm development costs.
Replacement of infrastructure lost by the creation
Garrison Dam.
Preferential rights to Pick-Sloan Missouri River
power.
Development of shoreline recreational potential.
Return of excess lands.
Additional financial compensation.
Protection of reserved water rights.
Other items the five-member commission may
appropriate.
Funding of all items from Garrison Diversion Unit
if authorized.

of the
Basin

deem
funds,

Id. at 187.
302. Interior Secretary Donald P. Hodel created the JTAC on May 10,
1985, and the committee submitted its final report to him on May 23, 1986. See S.
Rep. No. 102-250 (1992).
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just compensation claim against the United States. 303 They urged the
JTAC to review all the circumstances surrounding this federal taking. Such
a comprehensive review was essential for the commission’s reliable
inquiry into the fairness of the taking of the Fort Berthold Reservation.
Whether the federal government had made a good faith effort to
justly compensate the Mandan, Hidatsa and Arikara peoples was the most
significant issue confronted by the JTAC. That issue focused the JTAC’s
attention on the administrative and legislative record that ostensibly
justified the 1949 Garrison taking. 304
Testimony by natural resource economists and related experts
aided the JTAC in its examination of the Indians’ claims. 305 They
provided the JTAC with a valuation theory of Indian lands that fulfilled
the “make whole” command of the Just Compensation Clause. 306 Other
expert testimony provided the JTAC with historical and sociological
evidence of the taking’s devastating effects on the social and cultural life
of these Indian people. 307
But the Indians’ claim for just compensation was strenuously
opposed by the BIA. 308 Indeed, Secretary Hodel eliminated the just
compensation issue from the JTAC’s charter despite the GDUC’s explicit
303. The GDUC’s finding that the “tribes of the . . . Fort Berthold Indian
Reservation bore an inordinate share of the cost of implementing Pick-Sloan Missouri
River Basin Program mainstem reservoirs,” and its direction to the Secretary that he
“find ways to resolve inequities borne by the tribes” were interpreted by the JTAC as
a warrant for hearing the Indians' just compensation claims. See S. Rep. No. 102-250,
at 3 (1991).
304. Id.
305. Dr. Cummings valued tribal lands that were taken by estimating the
“flow of the land base earnings or income that was attributable to that resource.” He
then “capitalized [the expected income flows] at 3.5% which was then the
Congressionally-mandated rate in 1950, and then he raised that [[amount] to 1986
dollars. At the time of the filing of the JTAC report, this totaled $178.4 million for
the Fort Berthold Reservation.” See RONALD G. CUMMINGS, VALUING THE RESOURCE
BASE LOST BY THE THREE AFFILIATED TRIBES AS RESULT OF LANDS TAKEN FROM
THEM FOR THE GARRISON PROJECT 47 (Feb. 13, 1986) (unpublished report prepared
for the JTAC, on file with the author).
306. The JTAC chairman, General Murry, testified at the hearings on S.
168, the Equitable Compensation Act for the Three Affiliated Tribes, that the
enactment of just compensation legislation on behalf of these tribes would serve as a
means for helping the tribes re-establish a viable economic base “that was destroyed
by the construction of the [Garrison Dam and Reservoir].” Id. at 2.
307. Id.
308. The Senate report accompanying S. 168 recounts that the BIA's
testimony was “strongly opposed to S. 168 [because] the United States is under no
continuing legal liability to provide any additional compensation to [the tribes].” S.
Rep. No. 102-250, at 3 (1985).
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directive to the contrary. 309 However, the JTAC construed the “other
issues” portion of its charter so as to allow it to hear the Indians’ just
compensation claim. The BIA argued that the Takings Act barred this
claim. But the GDUC’s express direction and its own secretarial charter
persuaded the commission that it could examine the equity of the Indians’
just compensation claim. 310
d. The Resolution of the Indians’ Just Compensation Claim by the JTAC
The Indians argued before the JTAC that Senator Arthur V.
Watkins’ Senate Indian Affairs Committee had demonstrably failed to
justly compensate them for their taken lands. They argued that their lands
should have been valued on the same basis as non-Indian lands that served
comparable government and public welfare functions. 311 They contended
that this valuation standard would fulfill two important underlying goals
of the Just Compensation Clause. First, such a valuation standard would
ensure the continuing viability of the affected Indian peoples as a
recognized government consistent with the purpose of their 1886
agreement with the federal government. 312 Second, such a valuation
standard would discourage future “rent seeking” initiatives by Indian
congressional committees that sought to exploit their plenary power over
Indian lands for their non-Indian constituents’ benefits. 313
The Indians’ treaty-reserved lands formed the essential trust res
that supported their governmental and economic infrastructure. As land,
it was comprised of the 156,035 acres of easily irrigable bottom lands that
were taken by the federal government. Destruction of those lands imposed
uncompensated economic losses on those Indians that could be measured
only by the capitalized values of the expected future incomes that would
have been generated by those lands.314
309. Id.
310. See Hearings on S. 168, at 30-1 (1985).
311. Cummings concluded the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation
represented a dedicated public entity whose land possessed a value to the tribal
community that far transcended its fair market value. CUMMINGS, supra note 305, at
14–15.
312. Cummings points to the Indian congressional committees’ keen
awareness, in light of the MRBI reports, that the Fort Berthold Indians would lose the
vast majority of their arable and irrigable land base essential for carrying out the
purpose of the 1886 agreement. Id. at 23–24.
313. The Supreme Court enunciated the equivalent value or standard for
just compensation in Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312,
326, 341 (1893).
314. Id.
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The JTAC recognized that the federal government had a legal duty
to make the Indians whole for their economic losses. Therefore the JTAC
directed Dr. Ronald G. Cummings, a leading natural resource economist,
to do an assessment of the Indians’ economic losses imposed by the 1949
taking. 315 He was directed to use known and accepted 1949 valuation
standards as the means to capitalize the stream of income the Indians
would have received from those lands. Such a valuation approach
replicated Congress’ 1946 valuation standard that required the War
Department to provide the Indians with the “in-kind” replacement value
of their taken lands. The War Secretary had been directed to provide the
Indians with land comparable in quality and sufficient in area to
compensate the tribes for the land on the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation
inundated by the construction of the Garrison Dam. 316 The JTAC
interpreted this congressional standard as holding that only ‘in-kind’ or
substitute compensation would fairly compensate these Indian peoples for
the loss of their lands.” 317
The JTAC’s next task was to determine what amount of
replacement or substitute value would adequately compensate the Indians
for the taking of their lands. Such an alternate valuation standard had been
endorsed by the Supreme Court in the taking of lands that served essential
governmental or public welfare functions. That the Indians’ taken lands
provided the social welfare and governmental benefits described by the
Court was evidenced by their use of those lands for tribal farming and
ranching activities as contemplated by the 1886 agreement. Only the
continued existence of these lands, or the just compensation equivalent,
would enable the affected Indians to fulfill those treaty-defined goals.
The JTAC issued its final report in 1986 and recommended that
the Secretary of Interior propose federal legislation on behalf of the
Mandan, Hidatsa and Arikara peoples that would award them just
compensation for the 1949 taking of the Fort Berthold Reservation.318 The
JTAC recommended that the just compensation amount should range
between $178.4 million and $411.8 million. In calculating compensation,
the JTAC had directed Dr. Cummings to use two alternative formulas. The

315. Three Affiliated Tribes and Standing Rock Sioux Tribal Equitable
Compensation Act of 1991: Hearings on S. 168 Before the Select Comm. on Ind.
Affairs, 102d Cong. 16–19 (1991) [hereinafter Hearings on S. 168] (statement of Kent
Conrad, U.S. Senator).
316. North Dakota History 251–52 (Ray H. Mattison ed., 1968).
317. S. Rep. No. 102-250, at 3 (1992).
318. Id.
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JTAC’s award range reflects the application of the alternative valuation
formulas. 319
e. The Mandan, Hidatsa and Arikara Peoples Confront the Challenge of
Social and Economic Recovery on the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation
Interior Secretary Hodel declined to accept the JTAC report or
implement any of the commission’s recommendations. Instead, the Senate
Select Committee on Indian Affairs and the House Interior Subcommittee
on Water and Power initiated joint oversight hearings on the JTAC’s final
report in 1986. 320 The JTAC’s just compensation recommendation was
referred by the Select Committee to the General Accounting Office
(“GAO”) for its analysis and response. The GAO report, issued in 1990,
concluded that, although it somewhat disagreed with the economic
methodology used by the JTAC, the JTAC’s findings provided a
substantial basis for Congress to consider an equitable award of just
compensation to the Indians in the amount of $149.5 million. 321
Legislation to implement the JTAC’s just compensation recommendation
was introduced by Senator Kent Conrad from North Dakota. 322 It provided
$149.5 million in just compensation to the Mandan, Hidatsa and Arikara
peoples for the 1949 Fort Berthold taking. The BIA testified that it had no
opposition to this legislation as long as it otherwise met the “pay-as-yougo” constraints of the controlling budget resolution. 323

319. Id.
320. The Senate report accompanying S. 168 notes that the Senate Select
Committee on Indian Affairs held three oversight hearings on the JTAC
recommendations beginning on March 31, 1987, with a joint oversight hearing with
the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee and the Water and Power
Subcommittee of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. This hearing
examined the need for legislation to implement the recommendations of the JTAC
report. The second hearing was held on November 19, 1987, wherein the committees
“urged” the Tribes to provide “further justification for the level of additional financial
compensation to which they felt they were entitled” and “explore a budget neutral
means to finance the compensation needed to carry out the recommendations.” The
third hearing was held regarding S. 168 wherein the tribes “expressed their overall
support for the bill” and the GAO “expressed its approval of the compensation figures
set forth in [S. 168].” Id.
321. See Government Accounting Office (GAO), Report to the Chairman,
Select Committee on Indian Affairs, U.S. Senate Indian Issues: Compensation Claims
Analysis Overstates Economic Losses (1991).
322. See Hearings on S. 168, supra note 315, at 13–15.
323. The BIA representative testified that if the “Budget Enforcement Act
provisions can be complied with . . . the administration would look at that and give
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The Indians, after lengthy discussion with various interested
groups, including the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association,
were able to craft an agreement that would authorize the deposit of a
specified amount of Pick-Sloan hydropower receipts into a Treasury
account on behalf of the Mandan, Hidatsa and Arikara peoples. 324 The
Indians were required to submit an economic and social recovery plan to
the Interior Secretary that would govern the future expenditure of the just
compensation monies. The Indians would have access to the accumulated
interest on that account once it reached the amount of $149.5 million.
President Bush threatened to veto the legislation but, nonetheless, signed
the Act into law in November 1992 as part of a larger water resources
development bill. 325
E. The “Disjunctive” Moment: How the Mandan, Hidatsa and Arikara
Peoples May Achieve Social and Economic Recovery on the Fort
Berthold Reservation
The Mandan, Hidatsa and Arikara peoples have survived much
over the past two hundred years since their first encounter with American
power in the late fall of 1804 during their tribal council meetings with the
leaders of the American Corps of Discovery, Captains Meriwether Lewis
and William Clark. They now confront a new “disjunctive” moment in
their collective life as an Indian people. Can they effectively use the
$149.5 million in just compensation to reverse history and recover socially
and economically as a distinct people? Unlike the “one-shot” tribal
decision to “per-cap” the entire $7.5 million in compensation in the 1957
tribal referendum, the “pay-out” structure of the governing statute and the
congressional constraints on the use of the $149.5 million precludes any
such self-interested solution to this disjunctive moment. Like it or not, the
governing statute distributes only the accrued interest from this trust fund
on an annualized basis to the tribal people. They will therefore be forced
again and again to collectively re-decide the best use of that distributed
interest income for their economic and social recovery as a tribal people.326

consideration to the additional compensation.” Id. at 32 (statement of Patrick A.
Hayes, Bureau of Indian Affairs representative).
324. Id.
325. Reclamation Projects Authorization and Adjustment Act of 1992,
Pub. L. No. 102-575, 106 Stat. 4600.
326. Section 3504(a)(4) of the Act provides that “[s]uch interest shall be
available [to the Three Affiliated Tribes] . . . for use for educational, social welfare,
economic development, and other programs, subject to the approval of the Secretary.”

RICH NATIONS PROOF (Do Not Delete)

200

PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV.

9/9/2017 12:05 PM

Special Issue

As “repeat players,” the various tribal constituencies, who favor
competing social and economic recovery projects, will be forced to build
tribal coalitions and alliances so as to convince the Interior Secretary that
a majority of the Indian people support their particular approach to social
and economic recovery on the Fort Berthold Reservation. There is some
evidence that such a process is already underway among the Mandan,
Hidatsa and Arikara peoples. Between 1992 and 1999, the accrued annual
interest on this fund of $149.5 million accumulated $33 million. The
pending secretarial distribution of this large sum of money has prompted
much heated discussion among various tribal constituencies as to the
appropriate use of this money for social and economic recovery
purposes. 327
The current tribal business council has proposed a plan for
investing $30 million of the money in a tribal endowment fund that would
be managed by a private investment firm. It promises that this investment
will earn an expected annual interest rate of 10% compared to the 6.5%
annual rate of interest that they would earn if they are administered by the
Office of Trust Funds Management (“OTFM”). Under the tribal council’s
plan, about 50% of the annual income would be made available for tribal
programs consistent with its proposed social and economic recovery
plan. 328
But the proposed plan also authorizes the tribal business council
to invade the fund’s corpus and use up to 25% of its principal as security
for any borrowing authorized by the tribal council. This provision has
been greeted with skepticism by many tribal members. They question
whether stepping away from federal trust management of this major tribal
resource is a good idea. Some fear that this is a “power-grab” by a
potentially corrupt tribal council that would misuse these tribal funds for
personal benefit. Other tribal members fear that approval of such a plan
would motivate individuals to “get on the council” so that they can invade
proposed endowment funds for their own pet projects. 329
Section 3506 provides that “[n]o part of any moneys in any fund, under this title shall
be distributed to any member of the Three Affiliated Tribes . . . on a per capita basis.”
327. An opinion letter by Mr. Jerry Nagel, a tribal member and vicechairman of the Fort Berthold Land Owners Association, challenged the proposed
tribal investment plan. His letter states that “the council wants a dowry for themselves
not an endowment for [the tribal members].” He continues, saying that the proposed
tribal referendum on this plan presents the tribal members with an option to “vote to
get 25% of nothing or 50% of nothing and the council gets 100% to spend at will.”
(on file with author).
328. Id.
329. Ms. Phyllis Old Dog Cross articulates some of these concerns in her
letters to Senator Byron Dorgan (D. N.D.). She asks the Senator to investigate the
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This internal tribal controversy over the use of this $33 million,
far from dismaying anyone, should evidence the catalytic moment wherein
the Mandan, Hidatsa and Arikara peoples strive to reclaim responsibility
for their economic and social futures. It is a daunting task, but only these
Indian peoples can successfully re-internalize those values, needs and
circumstances that brought them together originally as the Three Affiliated
Tribes. Indeed, this $149.5 million may serve as the crude surrogate for
those values as these Indian peoples seek to reconstitute their society so as
to accomplish social and economic recovery. 330 No doubt, some of these
funds will be misspent or foolishly invested by future tribal councils, but
that is to be expected and absorbed as corrective guidance for future
collective action. The “social discount” rate governing the impact of such
expected tribal mistakes lowers their cost to near zero over these Indian
peoples’ long-term future. 331
1. How This Disjunctive Moment Will Support the Renewal of the
Mandan, Hidatsa and Arikara Peoples
Over the past two hundred years the Mandan, Hidatsa and Arikara
peoples have become enfolded into a non-Indian historical process from
which they may now have the opportunity to escape. Moreover, their
conscious assumption of their economic and social recovery task will lift
them outside of this historical process.
Because these Indian people have been enveloped for so long
within a dependency-generating historical process, they will have to
expend a great deal of collective social and emotional energy to escape.
They should perhaps listen to my young daughter’s preschool song about
successfully confronting an obstacle that is “too deep to go under it, too
wide to go around it, too high to go over it, so I guess we’ll have to go
through it.”
proposed “referendum election now being held by the Tribal Council of the Three
Affiliated Tribes.” She believes the plan is “not a wise move” and asks whether the
“funds, principle [sic] and interest [are] being protected as well as invested right
now?” (on file with author).
330. Other Indian peoples, such as the Makah people along the Puget
Sound in Washington, focus more directly on the restoration of ancient cultural and
economic practices, such as the hunting and harpooning of five to six grey whales
annually, as the means of re-engaging their young people with the central reality of
their people’s heritage.
331. Many Indian peoples seek to evaluate a present choice from the
standpoint of the “Seventh Generation.” This practice impresses on the minds of
today’s Indian leaders that the effects of their actions may well irredeemably mark the
remote futures of, as yet, unborn Indian children.
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By penetrating this veil of a burdening American historical
experience, the Mandan, Hidatsa and Arikara peoples can restore their
distinctive character within a radically resituated Fort Berthold
Reservation. By much expenditure of social and emotional energy, these
Indian peoples can redefine their place within the evolving societal mosaic
of America. Such conscious self-exertion marks the classic strategy of the
Indian peoples in carving out a place for themselves within an often hostile
American society. 332
The Mandan, Hidatsa and Arikara people, in embarking on their
path of social and economic recovery, must confront the high psychic and
social costs imposed on their peoples by the accumulated effects of their
American historical experience. Cross-cultural psychologists characterize
the “spiritual injury” caused by “inter-generational post-traumatic stress
disorder” as a “soul wound.” 333
Converting this $149.5 million into an effective therapy requires
the development of strategies that will directly address the assorted
maladies that evidence the “soul wound” to the Mandan, Hidatsa and
Arikara peoples. This will be the major task for collective action by these
Indian peoples as they pursue social and economic recovery on the Fort
Berthold Indian Reservation. Can this money effectively catalyze the
deliberative social action necessary to “break” the inter-generational
transmission of societal trauma within this Indian society? 334
2. Catalyzing the “New Constitution” for the Mandan, Hidatsa and
Arikara Peoples
The repeated and necessary confrontations among powerful tribal
constituencies in constructing effective social action on the Fort Berthold
Reservation will eventually result in a new constitution for the Three
Affiliated Tribes. This new constitution will reconnect these contesting
tribal constituencies with a renewed understanding of their peoples’ latent
and emerging values. At a pragmatic and instrumental level, these

332. Regaining what Anthony Giddens calls the “human agency of
control” over one’s own life experiences has fueled Indian peoples’ resistance to the
hegemonic influence of federal Indian law over their collective and individual lives.
Federal Indian law is, among other things, a “symbolic order” that has long sought to
“dominat[e] . . . the everyday context of [Indians’] lived experience.” By disrupting
the federal government’s effort to “connect signification and legitimation” of such
hegemonic efforts, the Indian peoples’ have been able to survive federal Indian law.
MUMBY, supra note 273, at 82–83.
333. See supra notes 270–71 and accompanying text.
334. Id.

SOVEREIGN BARGAINS PROOF (Do Not Delete)

2017

TRIBES AS RICH NATIONS

9/9/2017 12:05 PM

203

confrontations will distill these values and understandings into sociallyaccountable political expression requiring effective and responsive
institutions of governance. At a societal level, these confrontations will
progressively re-embed the tribal government within a renewed tribal
identity. Only through such a reconstitutionalizing effect will they reclaim
their tribal institutions from their imposed, Americanized functions under
John Collier’s IRA and federal Indian common law. 335
I will offer only general guidelines for this task: to do more would
unduly intrude into the free sovereign choice of these Indian peoples. My
recommendations draw upon A. K. Sen’s recent constructive approach to
social governance as the essential means for realizing human freedom.
First, such a tribal constitution would consciously promote the full
development of the human capabilities of individual tribal members by
according them appropriate opportunities for meaningful social and
political participation. Second, such a tribal constitution would explicitly
promote the growth of traditional tribal constituencies and encourage the
articulation of their interests and values in a socially-comprehensible
manner. Third, such a tribal constitution would require the ruling tribal
leadership to demonstrate that it “hears” their peoples’ demands and needs
by responding in a politically and socially accountable manner. 336
Two additional background requirements provide the context for
the “working-out” of this new tribal constitution. First, these Indian
peoples must consciously reject what Professor Mary Midgley calls the
paralyzing “menace of fatalism.” 337 This fatalism is embodied in the
prevailing American view that innate genetic, cultural or biological factors
have doomed the contemporary Indian societies to decline and eventual
disappearance. Many Indian people, including some on the Fort Berthold
Indian Reservation, have “bought into” this view. Only by consciously
rejecting such fatalism about their future as an Indian people will the
Mandan, Hidatsa and Arikara people avoid a paralysis of the needed
action. 338

335. By restoring “narrative capacity” to the Indian peoples, they are
removed from the “strategies of containment” evidenced in federal Indian law
decisions. Federal Indian law accomplishes its goal by imposing a “sense of
determinacy on the [Indian] social actor’s world, simultaneously obscuring ways in
which reality is over determined; that is, structured by the underlying relations of
power that place material limitations on how social reality is framed.” MUMBY, supra
note 273, at 106.
336. See SEN, supra note 274, at 145–59.
337. MARY MIDGLEY, WICKEDNESS: A PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAY 93–98
(1984).
338. Id.
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Second, the Indian people must adopt the principle of
“enoughness” as expressing their confidence that they can effectively use
their existing material and social resources in defining and meeting their
pressing social and economic recovery needs. Only by presuming that
$149.5 million can be subdivided into enough societal resources—income,
food, power, prestige and authority—to meet their peoples’ needs in a
socially accountable manner, will this reconstitutionalizing process
succeed on the Fort Berthold Reservation. This principle requires future
tribal councils to prudently “grow” this $149.5 million in a manner that
creates a sustainable “steady-state” tribal economy so as to ensure the fair
and equitable distribution of societal resources. 339
IV. CONCLUSION: RECONCILIATION
Reconciling the past two hundred years of federal-Indian relations
requires the American and Indian peoples to escape from a “history that
no one wanted.” 340 This history, embodied in its main engine—federal
Indian law—still seeks to remake the Indian peoples by altering their
somatic features, languages, territorial distributions, governmental
institutions, as well as their cultural and religious belief-systems. This
history has damaged, and continues to damage, the American and Indian
peoples in fundamental ways. It has demeaned, and continues to demean,
a proud and accomplished people, the American people, who, to create this
history, openly flouted their most basic and cherished tenets of life, liberty
and happiness for all Americans. It has proven unduly destructive of the
lives and resources of the Indian peoples, the American people’s ostensible
wards entitled to their solicitude and protection. It has proven to be a
yahoo’s history of the American West and only yahoos would wish it to
continue. 341
339. Id.
340. DENNIS M. WRONG, THE PROBLEM OF ORDER: WHAT UNITES AND
DIVIDES SOCIETY 236–43 (1994).
341. Nathan Glazer quotes the historical musing of one such yahoo, Teddy
Roosevelt, who concludes in his history of Winning of the West that:
Looking back, it is easy to say that much of the wrong-doing could
have been prevented; but if we examine the facts to find out the
truth, not to establish a theory, we are bound to admit that the
struggle could not possibly have been avoided . . . Unless we were
willing that the whole continent west of the Alleghenies should
remain an unpeopled waste, the hunting ground of savages, war
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Why this unwanted history is so tenaciously and continually
reproduced in federal Indian law decisions requires us to look at its
generative source. Freud viewed its generative source in this manner:
Men are not gentle creatures who want to be loved, and
who at most can defend themselves if attacked; they are,
on the contrary, creatures among whose instinctual
endowments is to be reckoned a powerful share of
aggressiveness. As a result, their neighbor is for them not
only a potential helper or sexual object, but also someone
who tempts them to satisfy their aggressiveness on him,
to exploit his capacity for work without compensation, to
use him sexually without his consent, to seize his
possessions, to humiliate him, to cause him pain, to
torture and kill him, Homo homini lupus. Who in the face
of all his experience of life and of history, will have the
courage to dispute this assertion? As a rule this cruel
aggressiveness waits for some provocation or puts itself
at the service of some other purpose, whose goal might
also have been reached by milder measures. In
circumstances that are favorable to it, when the mental
counter-forces which ordinarily inhibit it are out of action,
it also manifests itself spontaneously and reveals man as
a savage beast to whom consideration towards his own
kind is something alien. Anyone who calls to mind the
atrocities committed during the racial migrations or the
invasion of the Huns, or by the people known as Mongols
under [Genghis] Khan and Tamerlane, or at the capture of
Jerusalem by the pious Crusaders, or even, indeed the
horrors of the recent World War—anyone who calls these
things to mind will have to bow humbly before the truth
of this view. 342
This unwanted history and its child, federal Indian law, were born
out of such a crucible of national aggression exalted by Teddy Roosevelt
and others. This history remains fresh in the minds of its adherents only
through its constant re-enactment. Thus the new “Indian wars” are now
cast as legal struggles over Indian land, sovereignty and beliefs. These
was inevitable.
Glazer, supra note 42, at 12–13.
342. WRONG, supra note 340, at 141.
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ritualized aggressions allow a new American generation to renew their
mythic kinship ties, forged long ago in the heat, blood and sweat of their
remote ancestors’ wars to dispossess the Indian peoples. Not surprisingly,
Freud concluded that such a history of “ethnic nationalism” becomes the
means by which law embodies and re-enacts the aggressive instincts of its
people so as to enable their identification and reinforce their loyalty to the
state:
[The] state has forbidden the practice of wrong-doing, not
because it desired to abolish it, but because it desires to
monopolize it, like salt and tobacco. The warring state
permits itself every such misdeed, every such act of
violence, as would disgrace the individual man. 343
This history renders, for me, banal the efforts of contemporary
legal commentators to remake federal Indian law via critique.344 Even if
successful in its own terms, it reinforces what Erik Erikson calls the
“pseudo-speciation” of a group: in this case, of Indian peoples as tribes.
Only a new history, not the yahoo’s history of the American West, created
by the Indian peoples themselves will serve to rebuild their lives, cultures
and economies. 345
Some argue that this old American history is already in eclipse
and that a new American history is waiting to be born. Some will mourn,
like James Truslow Adams who published The Epic of America in 1931,
this passing of the old America. 346 He spoke of America as:
That dream . . . has evolved from the hearts and burdened
souls of many millions, who have come to us from all
nations. If some of them have too great faith, we know
not yet to what faith may attain, and may harken to the
voice of one of them, Mary Antin, a young immigrant
who comes to us from Russia . . . . Sitting on the steps of
the Boston Public Library, where the treasures of the
whole of human thought had been opened to her, she
wrote: “This is my latest home, and it invited me to a glad
new life . . . . The past cannot hold me, because I have
343. Id. at 174.
344. See Robert A. Williams, Jr., Columbus’s Legacy: The Rehnquist
Court’s Perpetuation of European Cultural Racism Against American Indian Tribes,
39 FED. B. NEWS & J. 6 (1992).
345. WRONG, supra note 340, at 181.
346. Glazer, supra note 42, at 16.
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grown too big; just as the little house in Polotzk, once my
home, has now become a toy of memory, as I move about
in the wide spaces of this splendid palace . . . . America is
the youngest of nations, and inherits all that went before
it in history. And I am the youngest of America’s
children, and into my hands is given all her priceless
heritage . . . . Mine is the whole majestic past, and mine is
the shining future.” 347
A noted Harvard sociologist, Nathan Glazer, characterizes this
newborn American history as one fraught with doubts, hesitancies and
fears, just as its old history was characterized by optimism, confidence and
a boundless sense of American power:
This brings us up to date in considering America as epic.
The epic of the frontier closed a long time ago. Many
have worried about what succeeds it. Let us project
America overseas, some have said, in imperialist
conquest, or in fighting tyranny, or in improving the life
of other peoples. We have now withdrawn from the
empire, though a few places remain. We face no great
tyranny, and our will in facing even small tyrannies is not
strong. We are now doubtful about our capacity to
improve the lives of other peoples. The new frontier, we
are told, must be education, or space, or good group
relations. How often have we heard it said: How come
we can reach the moon and not improve our cities or race
relations? Clearly it must be easier to reach the moon, and
that does require heroes and is a subject of epic stature. I
doubt whether the improving of group relations can
replace the conquest of a continent as the subject of an
epic. Of course, we can live without an American epic.
But that does diminish us, and it is easy to understand why
some of our poets, artists, writers and historians keep on
trying. 348
Any new American epic of history would be radically incomplete,
in my mind, without a prominent place reserved for the Indian peoples.
They are rich in those redemptive social and cultural beliefs and practices
347.
348.

Id. at 18.
Id. at 20.
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that “hold societies together.” 349 These are the precise affiliative resources
that the American people have lost—families, small groups and networks
of interacting individuals cooperating in the pursuit of common goals. 350
Whereas Americans of all ages are actively encouraged to economically
and socially embrace the increasingly abstract relations of the new “biocybernetic” society, 351 the Indian peoples—insulated by poverty, by
remoteness and by their legal status as tribes—have the opportunity to
reinvigorate their “flesh and blood” life-worlds.
Because there is no “off-ramp” from America’s information
society into Indian Country, the Federal Communication Commission
(“FCC”) has been directed by Congress to build an information bridge into
the Indian peoples’ lives. 352 But the Indian peoples are not asking for such
an information technology to enrich their lives. Instead they are simply
asking for the freedom promised by the old America, a freedom not
granted to the Indian peoples. Or, in response to the new America’s offer
of information technologies, some of the older Indians may say, as Kant
did long ago, the only information that really matters for human use is
already encoded in the “hieroglyphs of the heart.” 353
349. WRONG, supra note 340, at 242.
350. Id.
351. Anthony Giddens clearly distinguishes between “social integration”
and “systems integration”:
With the development of abstract systems, trust in impersonal
principles, as well as in anonymous others, becomes indispensable
to social existence. Nonpersonalized trust of this sort is discrepant
from basic trust. There is a strong psychological need to find others
to trust, but institutionally organized personal connections are
lacking, relative to pre-modern social situations. . . . Routines
which were previously part of everyday life or the “lifeworld”
become drawn off and incorporated into abstract systems . . . .
Routines which are structured by abstract systems have an empty,
unmoralised character—this much is valid in the idea that the
impersonal increasingly swamps the personal.
WRONG, supra note 340, at 233–34.
352. But the FCC’s order of June 20, 2000, seeking to promote universal
service within Indian Country, will likely fail because of the threshold requirement
that Indian tribes demonstrate state authority to designate and regulate communication
carriers serving tribal lands has been preempted by federal law. Jennifer L. King,
Increasing Telephone Penetration Rates and Promoting Economic Development on
Tribal Lands: A Proposal to Solve the Tribal and State Jurisdictional Problems, 53
FED. COMM. L.J. 137, 140–41 (2000).
353. JOHN DURHAM PETERS, SPEAKING INTO THE AIR: A HISTORY OF THE
IDEA OF COMMUNICATION 254 (1999).

